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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and 
recommends ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some 
countries.  Through an analysis of three cases of prolonged internal wars, in the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, I test two hypotheses and attempt to gain a better 
understanding of how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of 
conflict that does not seem likely to end.  A central government’s proximity to the 
violence in an internal war and, to a lesser degree, desensitization to violence over the 
course of decades of conflict, both contribute to protraction in some internal wars.  
Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding factors in the 
outcome of internal conflicts.  Effectively managing the resolve to end a conflict, 
enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a government’s 
resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted war problem.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. STAGNATION AND COSTS OF WAR  
Money and other resources are usually running short and his moral 
impulse is not sufficient for a greater effort. In such a case he does the 
best he can; he hopes that the outlook will improve although he may have 
no ground for such hopes. Meanwhile, the war drags slowly on, like a 
faint and starving man. Thus interaction, the effort to outdo the enemy, the 
violent and compulsive course of war, all stagnate for lack of real 
incentive.  
Carl von Clausewitz as cited in Darley.1 
Clausewitz’s notion of the interaction in war becoming stagnated for lack of real 
incentive is one of the underlying themes of this thesis, more specifically, this thesis 
examines the conditions that affect the belligerents’ incentive or will to fight in war.  To 
take it a step further, I examine contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and 
recommend ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some 
countries.  Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding 
factors in the outcome of internal wars.  Effectively managing the resolve to end a 
conflict, enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a 
government’s resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted 
war problem.   
Few people have not felt the effects of war in one way or another.  The indirect 
impact of war for the majority of the world’s population is not readily identifiable; 
however, for many, war and the violence directly associated with it is an unpleasant fact 
that they can do little about other than to adapt to it and continue living.  By some 
estimates, over 160 million people died because of wars fought in the 20th century.2  
Increasingly, since the end of the Cold War, interstate wars, or wars between states, are 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 184–85, as cited in Darley, William M., “War Policy, Public Support, 
and the Media,” Parameters, Summer 2005.   
2 Piero Scaruffi, “Wars and Genocides of the 20th Century,” 
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html (accessed October 30, 2009). 
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becoming less and less common, and intrastate wars, or wars within a state, are becoming 
more prevalent.3  Numerous internal wars that began several decades ago continue 
unabated, stuck in a type of war stagnation.   
The U.S. decisively won two of the most recent major interstate wars: the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S.’s Second Iraq War, in direct conventional 
engagements.  However, these wars morphed into wars between the new state (bolstered 
by a U.S.-led coalition) and belligerent non-state actors, becoming predominately internal 
conflicts with no clear lines of battle, an obscurely defined end-state, and high potential 
for stagnation—making no significant progress one way or another.  The problem then, is 
to understand how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of 
conflict that does not seem likely to end.   
The costs of conflict in terms of human loss of life, education, development, and 
economics is incalculable, but what can be done to reduce the costs, to make the burden 
of war more bearable or to successfully resolve certain conflicts altogether on more 
amenable terms than current trends in warfare demonstrate?  The search for a better 
understanding of wars between state and non-state actors, how some of these wars 
proceed for seemingly indefinite periods, and how the costs associated with this kind of 
war can be reduced or eliminated on terms that are more realistic is the purpose of this 
thesis.  By gaining a better understanding of internal conflicts and protracted internal 
conflicts more specifically, and by examining successes and failures in these wars, I have 
developed some recommendations, which could help those involved in the war (internally 
or externally) achieve a better outcome than if they continue fighting indefinitely.   
B. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is composed of four chapters, with Chapters II and III comprising the 
bulk of the project.  Chapter I establishes the relevance of this study in terms of the costs 
of internal wars and provides an overview of the thesis in general terms.  
                                                 
3 Piero Scaruffi, “Wars and Genocides of the 20th century.” 
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Chapter II establishes the thesis question, defines the types of internal wars 
important for this study, and provides a review of relevant literature used to develop two 
hypotheses, a central government’s proximity to violence and a gradual desensitization to 
violence by those involved, which attempt to explain how some internal wars can proceed 
for indeterminate amounts of time.  Chapter II also explains, in detail, the two hypotheses 
used during the analysis of three cases of prolonged internal war, offers alternative 
hypotheses for conflict analysis, and provides a brief outline of the case study 
methodology.   
Chapter III consists of three internal war case studies, each providing analysis of 
the case as it relates to the proposed hypotheses.  The duration of each conflict was at 
least 30 years and has yet to reach a clear outcome.4  Each case study analyzes the level 
and location of violence to determine potential relationships to the conflict duration.  
Lastly, Chapter IV restates the proposed hypotheses, summarizes the results of each case 
study and if the results support or refute the hypotheses, and outlines recommendations 
that may help to bring about better outcomes in the sphere of resolving internal conflicts. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS  
No two conflicts are the same; parallels can be drawn among wars fought in 
different times, in different places, and for different reasons, but each case should be 
understood for what it is and only in a limited context for its similarities to a separate 
war.  I use only three cases in this thesis, which is sufficient for gaining a better 
understanding of prolonged internal wars, but is not conclusive for the analysis of the 
hypotheses.  Further research in the study of prolonged internal wars could use key 
findings from the case studies used here to analyze other cases or a larger sample of 
internal wars.  Other studies of internal wars could account for variance in variables such 
 
 
                                                 
4 Outcomes here are defined as winner/loser or negotiated settlement and a third possible outcome of 
stalemate with continued participation by the opposing sides discussed throughout this thesis.  The Sri 
Lankan Civil War has ostensibly ended by military defeat of the LTTE, but history has shown the resilience 
and ability of the LTTE to bounce back.   
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as: type of government, type of insurgency, role of external support to either side, 
strategies employed, and results of attempted negotiations, to see if some of the same 
conclusions apply to more internal conflicts.   
Too often, war strategists and policymakers think that what worked in one 
situation will work in a similar situation without understanding the nuances of the 
specific situation in which they find themselves.  The study of historical lessons learned 
is no doubt useful; however, policy makers and war practitioners should exercise caution 
when preconceiving solutions for situations outside of its respective context.  The reader 
of this thesis should take the general observations and conclusions outlined here with the 
understanding of these limitations.   
Although the studies of the three cases in this thesis are limited in depth, I attempt 
to provide as much relevant detail as necessary to understand the context of each conflict 
and its relationship to the proposed hypotheses.  Quantifiable statistics for each of the 
cases are not uniform and not of the scope preferential for this type of analysis; therefore, 
I have attempted objective analysis based on the narrative of each conflict when actual 
data was not available.   
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF 
PROLONGED INTERNAL WARS 
A. INTERNAL WARS WITHOUT END 
The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. 
Henry Kissinger, as cited in Mack.5   
War has, for as long as recorded history, existed as a means of resolving 
differences in the values of divergent groups when the groups cannot otherwise obtain 
peaceful solutions.  In modern times, when nation states engaged in war against other 
nation states, the conflict usually took a course of large-scale, direct engagements in an 
attempt to win the war as expediently as possible.  Though state verses state wars have 
not always ended quickly, no major interstate wars from the 20th century on have lasted 
more than 10 years.6  
When groups within a state engage in war to promote a particular agenda against 
the state, the group that opposes the state pursues either a more protracted approach than 
state verses state war or pursues a quick overthrow of the state when conditions exist for 
the expeditious achievement of counter state goals.  Wars within a state, internal wars, 
revolutions, civil wars, etc., can and often times do last for prolonged periods.  A number 
of scholars (McCormick, Arreguin-Toft, Galula, Mack) have explained how weak 
adversaries defeat imperial powers in asymmetric wars or how the authority or rebellion 
achieves victory in an internal conflict; however, the causes of prolonged internal 
conflicts lasting decades, where neither side defeats the other, requires further analysis.   
In this chapter, I examine several theories concerning the outcome of internal 
wars, propose two hypotheses to explain the conditions under which some internal wars 
                                                 
5 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2: (1975), 175–200; Mack quotes Henry Kissinger on 178. 
6 Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, “Wars of the Twentieth Century,” 
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-list.htm (accessed August 4, 2009). This atlas lists the largest military 
casualty producing wars of the twentieth century, of which only the First Sudanese Civil War lasted more 
than ten years.  The First Sudanese Civil War falls into the category of internal wars discussed later in this 
chapter.   
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proceed indefinitely, and provide an overview of three cases of prolonged internal wars 
that I use to look for evidence to support my hypotheses.     
B. INTERNAL WARS AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
This study uses a definition of internal war as, “the full range of activities 
considered to be political violence provided that they challenge the ability of a 
government to maintain order within its borders.”7  Internal wars encompass the gamut of 
armed conflict used to achieve political goals within a given country.  With or without 
external influence and support, these wars can range from revolutionary wars, coup 
d’états and insurgencies to wars of secession and civil wars.  David Galula discusses the 
duration of insurgencies in Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice.  “It is not 
like an ordinary war – a ‘continuation of the policy by other means’ – because an 
insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force,”8 and can 
continue as long as the insurgent has a cause and the will to fight for his cause.  Galula’s 
point about the timeline of insurgencies is not necessarily limited to revolutionary forms 
of insurgency, as separatists movements can also employ insurgent tactics to expand their 
cause before they resort to force.   
Galula classifies two types of insurgency doctrine that a counter-state can employ 
to achieve its objective vis-à-vis the state.  The first strategy, which Galula describes as 
“The Orthodox Pattern (Communist),” follows Mao Tse-tung’s method of protracted 
peoples’ war, beginning at the threshold of legality, creating a party and united front, 
moving through guerrilla warfare, and finally escalating to a mass based war of 
movement.  An insurgent can move fluidly back and forth between phases of Mao’s 
concept of protracted warfare depending on his ability to expand his mass base or the 
state’s ability to contain him.  When an insurgent adheres strictly to Mao’s protracted 
warfare ideology, the war is likely to have a long duration due to the insurgent’s 
ideological foundation, political will, and his ability to dictate the terms of his 
                                                 
7 Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences Civil Wars and American Interests (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008): 7. 
8 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2006): 1.   
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engagement against the state.  According to Galula, counter-state groups can alternatively 
apply a different approach to insurgency as a means of rapidly achieving their goals.    
Galula’s second strategy, “The Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut,” employs 
blind terrorism, gaining publicity and latent support for the cause, followed by selective 
terrorism, destroying the links between the population and the counterinsurgent, and 
finally mobilizing the population to rapidly seize power from the state.9  The Bourgeois-
Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut, as Galula implies with its name, enables the insurgent to 
achieve a relatively quick victory when compared to Mao’s form of protracted warfare.  
Although the shortcut strategy can achieve positive results quickly, problems arise during 
the insurgent’s assumption of power, as he is not likely to possess the capacity or 
resources needed to control the state adequately.  Though Galula does not discuss it in 
detail in his Counterinsurgency Warfare book,10 a third type of internal war of interest 
for this study is war of secession.   
A war of secession does not intend to overthrow the state; rather, it seeks to create 
a new state from territory within an existing state.  Wars of secession can take on the 
form of insurgencies as well as traditional conventional warfare or a combination of both.  
Secessionist movements can end quickly or last for several decades depending on the 
will, capabilities, and resources of the breakaway group.   
No matter what form an internal war takes, under certain conditions many of these 
wars continue beyond a generation of human life, lasting 30 years or more.11  Wars 
lasting beyond 30 years are phenomena that neither the state nor the counter-state would 
likely accept if one of the sides could have ended it decisively at an earlier point.   
In, “Things Fall Apart: the endgame dynamics of internal wars,” Gordon H. 
McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison explore the dynamics of the 
                                                 
9 For further discussion of the Orthodox Pattern (Communist) and the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: 
Shortcut see Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare, 29–42.  
10 David Galula discusses the difference between the form of warfare used in an insurgency and the 
form of warfare used in civil wars, which he says can take on the form of an ordinary international war.  
Counterinsurgency Warfare, 2–3.   
11 Many internal wars, of exceptionally long duration, experience “cease-fire periods” or periods of 
negotiated settlement that often fail to last, leading to a return to armed conflict.  
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endgame struggle in internal wars.12  McCormick et al. focus their research on internal 
wars in an effort to explain the observed pattern of state and insurgent defeat in internal 
conflicts, finding that the endgame is different for each side of an internal war.  The state 
typically loses decisively (quickly, when it does lose) and wins by pushing the insurgent 
below its breakpoint13 slower and slower over time.  The insurgents usually win 
decisively by pushing the state below its breakpoint at an increasing rate over time (when 
it does win) and lose gradually over time (when it loses).  Simply stated, when a state 
wins an internal war, it usually takes a long time and occurs at a slow rate due to 
McCormick’s proposition that as a state attempts to suppress or counter an insurgency, it 
becomes harder to defeat the smaller it becomes.  When an insurgent wins, their 
overthrow of the state usually happens rapidly, though the time required for the insurgent 
to reach the point at which they can overthrow the state can be long.  The two graphs in 
Figure 1 demonstrate an example of the rates of decline for (A) the state endgame and (B) 
the insurgent endgame, as a measure of strength verses time. 
 
 
Figure 1. A) State endgame; B) insurgent endgame.14 
                                                 
12 Gordon H McCormick, Steven B Horton & Lauren A Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: the endgame 
dynamics of internal wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 321–367. 
13 JG Taylor as cited by McCormick on p. 325.  Following the standard literature on combat modeling, 
the breakpoint is the point at which a combatant is no longer combat effective.  This occurs when one side 
either “breaks” or “breaks off the engagement.” (Taylor 1983). 
14 Gordon H McCormick, Steven B Horton & Lauren A Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: the endgame 
dynamics of internal wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 327. 
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McCormick et al. demonstrate that the data on modern internal wars (post 1945) 
show that the majority of internal conflicts end on the battlefield with the insurgent losing 
and a small majority ending in some type of negotiated settlement.  The remaining 
internal wars, over 15 percent of the total observed since 1945, have no clear winners.  
The authors describe the consequence of an “equilibrium trap” when considering an 
outcome of a stalemate in an internal war.  The term “equilibrium trap” captures the idea 
of how, 
The state is able to suppress the insurgency at a decreasing rate up to a 
point, but is not able to mobilize the marginal advantage necessary to push 
it below its breakpoint.  The insurgents, for their part, retain sufficient 
room for maneuver to stay in the game, but are unable to expand their 
presence given the state’s prevailing level of effectiveness.15   
The equilibrium trap term theoretically explains, in terms of a force ratio and level of 
effectiveness analysis, how an internal war can proceed indefinitely; however, it only 
accounts for the relative strengths of the state and insurgent and excludes other variables 
necessary to analyze the stalemate concept.  In the conduct of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, force ratios and their effectiveness are not the sole decider of conflict 
outcome, respective strategies also matter and can help explain which side will win or 
lose the war.     
Ivan Arreguin-Toft poses a theory/model of strategic interaction when 
considering the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts.  Arreguin-Toft uses his strategic 
interaction theory to account for victory and defeat of strong and weak actors in 
asymmetric conflicts, which include some internal wars with and without external actor 
support and exclusive state verses state wars.  He defines an asymmetric conflict as one 
in which, “the halved product of one actor’s armed forces and population exceeded the 
simple product of its adversary’s armed forces and population by 5:1 or more.”16  The 
strategic interaction model put forth by Arreguin-Toft narrowly defines the strategies 
available to strong and weak actors as either direct or indirect:   
                                                 
15 McCormick, Horton & Harrison, “Things Fall Apart,” 329–330.  
16 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 43. 
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Direct strategic approaches – e.g., conventional attack and defense – target 
an adversary’s armed forces with the aim of destroying or capturing that 
adversary’s physical capacity [sic] to fight, thus making will irrelevant… 
Indirect strategic approaches – e.g., barbarism and guerrilla warfare 
strategy (GWS) – most often aim to destroy an adversary’s will [sic] to 
resist, thus making physical capacity irrelevant.  Barbarism targets an 
adversary’s will by murdering, torturing, or incarcerating noncombatants.  
GWS attacks an adversary’s will by targeting enemy soldiers, though 
noncombatants may be targets as well.17   
Arreguin-Toft argues that when strong and weak actors employ like-minded 
strategic approaches (direct verses direct or indirect verses indirect) then the strong actor 
is likely to win.  When strong and weak actors employ opposite-minded strategic 
approaches (direct verses indirect or indirect verses direct) then the weak actor is likely to 
win.  Figure 2 shows a matrix summary of Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction thesis. 
 
 
Figure 2. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes, expected 
winners in cells.18 
Arreguin-Toft tested his hypothesis using the predictions of his model compared 
against a large sample of asymmetric conflict outcomes taken from the years 1800-2003; 
                                                 
17 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 34. 
18 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the weak win wars,” International Security 26 no. 1 (2001): 108. 
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he found that strong actors won 76.8 percent of all same-approach interactions, and weak 
actors won 63.6 percent of all opposite-approach interactions.19   
While Arreguin-Toft’s model is useful, his thesis has several shortcomings.20  His 
model discounts the importance of combined or mixed direct and indirect strategies by 
focusing on absolute direct or indirect strategies.21  His definition of an indirect strategy 
looks only at destroying an adversary’s will through coercive means without considering 
the possibility of changing the will of an adversary’s support base, through non-coercive 
means, thereby inhibiting the adversary’s ability to continue the fight.  Lastly, his model 
does not explain the outcome of a stalemate for wars that fail to reach a decisive 
conclusion.  In an internal war, force ratios and state and counter-state strategic 
approaches are important in analyzing patterns of victory and defeat; however, each 
side’s will to sustain the conflict also contributes to the duration of the war.     
In considering “asymmetric conflicts” that reach a decisive conclusion, Andrew 
Mack proposed a hypothesis of a “pre-theoretical perspective” to explain the outcome of 
asymmetric wars.22  While Mack focuses almost entirely on post World War II 
“industrial powers which become embroiled in long drawn-out wars in the Third 
World,”23 his analysis with regard to how and why big nations lose small wars is also 
useful for the study of strictly internal wars.  Mack argues that in asymmetric wars, if the 
insurgent destroys the will of the external power to continue the fight, then the external 
power’s military capability is irrelevant.  For the insurgent, the war is a total struggle to 
survive.  For the external power, the resources the nation is willing to commit to win, 
limits the war; its constraints are political, not material.  All the insurgent needs to do to 
                                                 
19 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 43–44.  
20 Arreguin-Toft, in How the Weak Win Wars, describes several alternative hypotheses to his own 
strategic interaction model and provides a concise review of existing theories relating to asymmetric war 
outcomes. 
21 Arreguin-Toft does analyze strategy shifts during different periods of war, but not the potential of 
the belligerents using multiple strategies simultaneously, which I would argue limits the potential for this 
type of analysis.   
22 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2, (1975): 175–200.   
23 Ibid. 
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win is, “to impose a steady accumulation of ‘costs’ on their opponents,”24 or in other 
words, “to not lose.”  As the external power incurs more and more costs, both economic 
and political, it loses the political capability to continue the fight, thereby delivering 
success to the insurgent.  In the revolutionary case, the idea of political will becomes 
even more apparent than in the asymmetric case of an industrial power at war in a 
developing nation; for the actors in internal wars, both sides are in a struggle to survive.   
When applying Mack’s argument in the context of an exclusively internal war, the 
interaction of state and counter-state determination or political will to win changes 
dramatically.  The state does not choose the conditions of a war against the counter-state.  
If a counter-state challenges a state’s survival, then the state’s will to fight and avoid 
concessions to the counter-state becomes like the will of an industrial power to maintain a 
war in a developing country, only with its survival at stake.  Both sides have their 
survival at stake; however, their respective survival is a matter of degree when neither 
side can mobilize the resources to achieve a clear victory.  If both sides do not lose, 
neither side wins.  If neither side wins the war and both sides maintain their political will 
to fight, then it could be possible for both sides to accept the conflict as a new status quo.  
It is difficult to measure political will in the context of conflict outcome until the conflict 
is over, at which point, and in certain contexts, an observer can argue that the prevailing 
actor possessed more political will than the loser did.  Although it is an abstract concept, 
political will can ultimately be the deciding factor in internal war outcomes.    
In Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson proposes a theory of social 
equilibrium, which helps explain another variable important in the study of internal wars.  
Johnson demonstrates a concept of how disequilibrium within a society can lead to 
revolution.  Johnson argues that when the values of a group or groups in a given social 
structure fall out of line with the central authority, then one side or the other must change 
in order to maintain equilibrium in the society.  If the differences in the two sides’ 
respective values become too disparate, then a revolutionary situation may occur forcing 
a period of conflict until either side wins or the opposing sides reach a compromise.25     
                                                 
24 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 175–200. 
25 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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If Johnson’s theory of social equilibrium and societal values is correct, then it 
might be possible for a shift to occur in the social values during a state/counter-state 
conflict such that all involved come to accept a level of violent social equilibrium or a 
higher threshold for violence in general.  A higher threshold for violence would 
consequently make it easier to sustain the political will necessary to continue the conflict.    
This thesis goes beyond the idea of McCormick’s equilibrium trap, which 
conceptually explains an outcome of stalemate in an internal war in terms of force ratios 
and levels of effectiveness, and Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction model of 
asymmetric conflict, which explains how strong and weak actor strategic approaches 
account for victory or defeat in an asymmetric conflict.  In formulating my hypotheses, I 
draw theoretically from Mack’s study of political will and Johnson’s theory of social 
equilibrium to focus on two factors, which lead to a stalemate or an acceptance of, what I 
call, a violent social equilibrium among a state, counter-state, and population.   
C. VIOLENT SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM/PROLONGED INTERNAL WAR 
HYPOTHESES  
This thesis proposes two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars 
become prolonged.  The first is that a central government’s distance from the violence in 
an internal war directly affects its will to end the war.  The second is that desensitization 
to violence among the participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), 
can lead to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the 
population of the state.    
The first part of the hypothesis contends that there is a direct correlation between 
the proximity of violence to the central government involved in an internal war and the 
state’s desire to quickly conclude the war.  In a classic protracted guerrilla warfare 
strategy, the insurgent purposefully avoids provoking the central government with large-
scale violence until the insurgent leader thinks he can directly defeat the central 
government’s security forces.  As an insurgent group’s attacks come physically closer to 
the seat of a central government, the more incentive the government has to quell the 
insurgency.  As the number of insurgent attacks increase in proximity to the central 
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government (i.e., within the capital city), then the government is more likely to divert the 
resources required to suppress the insurgency to an acceptable state.  If insurgent attacks 
are not in close proximity to the central government (i.e., attacks are more prevalent 
against rural authorities), then the central government is less likely to pool more 
resources to suppress the insurgency.   
When an insurgency challenges the government’s survival, the government must 
direct all of its resources to defeat the insurgency or delegitimize the insurgent’s cause, 
which it might not have done previously.  Related to the proximity variable is the 
government’s ability to function or maintain control of the state.  If a rebelling force does 
not physically threaten the central government’s ability to function, then the incentive for 
the state to conclude the war diminishes proportionately up to a point.  This is not to say 
that the state will not continue to prosecute the war against a rebelling organization, only 
that the state may subordinate their war effort to more pressing concerns when the central 
government is not significantly threatened.   
The second part of my hypothesis contends that the longer opposing sides fight in 
an internal war, the more participants in the war will become desensitized to the violence 
and more likely to continue the fight indefinitely.  As an internal war proceeds over the 
course of decades, the government and the rebellion begin to accept a life marred by 
conflict and are less inclined to end the fighting without an acceptable compromise or 
view fighting as the only means to accomplish respective goals.  The perceived costs for 
the rebelling group to continue fighting become lower over time.  Once a rebelling group 
crosses the line of employing violence against the state, it becomes inherently easier for 
the rebelling group to continue the use of violence to achieve their goals.  The 
government balances the costs to continue suppressing an insurgency with other priorities 
of the state up until the point when an insurgent is on the verge of overthrowing the state.  
In a protracted war, the insurgent can lull the state into a sense of false security by a using 
a limited amount of violence, making it more acceptable for the state to continue with the 
status quo.  All sides in the conflict still experience the negative effects of the war; 
however, the participants experience a gradual normalization to the negative effects as 
the war continues.   
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In the absence of an acceptable negotiated settlement, the political will necessary 
to sustain the conflict increases as a function of time for both the state and the counter-
state.  The state and counter-state accept the war as a new social equilibrium or way of 
life over a period of decades.  The level of violence acceptable to the actors increases 
steadily throughout the war, reinforcing each sides will to sustain the conflict.  Only 
when the counter-state exceeds the state’s acceptable level of violence will the state 
divert the resources required to suppress it to a more acceptable level.  As long as an 
internal war continues, then the likelihood that the war will continue indefinitely 
increases gradually over time unless one side does something to undermine the will of the 
other.  The desensitization to violence variable is also a product of a given country’s pre-
conflict history, culture, and other social factors, which ultimately affect the attitude and 
will of the public to accept the conditions of the war.   
D OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES AND APPROACH  
This thesis uses a case study analysis of three current and prolonged conflicts to 
test the two proposed hypotheses: the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia.  The NPA is the armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), a communist grounded insurgency that began 
in 1969 adhering strictly to the Maoist doctrine of protracted people’s war in an attempt 
to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).26  The LTTE 
began in 1976 as a spawn of the Tamil New Tigers, consolidating numerous separatist 
factions of ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka, seeking the creation of a separate Tamil state 
through the employment of insurgency, terrorism, and conventional warfare.27  The 
FARC began in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party seeking to 
overthrow the Colombian government.28  The FARC is rooted in a Marxist-Leninist 
                                                 
26 Jane’s Information Group, “New People’s Army (NPA),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 
July 17, 2009, http://search.janes.com (accessed July 28, 2009). 
27 Damien Kingsbury, “Sri Lanka,” in Hot Spot Asia and Oceania, ed. Clinton Fernandes, 229–240 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008): 231. 
28 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” Jane’s World 
Insurgency and Terrorism, July 29, 2009, http://search.janes.com (accessed August 10, 2009). 
 16
ideology following a similar path of armed struggle as that of the NPA.  The case studies 
will each provide a brief history of the country, previous conflicts, causes of the current 
conflict, evolution of the current conflict, and an account of location and level of violence 
throughout the conflict.   
In conducting the case study analysis, I attempt to answer the following questions:  
How does a state come to accept a violent state of social equilibrium with an armed 
resistance (counter-state)?  Why do some internal wars proceed indefinitely and others 
reach a logical conclusion?  Under what conditions is an internal war likely to end or not 
end?  Can a prolonged internal war reach an acceptable conclusion? If so, what are the 
likely outcomes and how do the participants in these wars achieve these outcomes?  What 
historical, cultural, and sociological factors affect the outcome of internal wars?  Do the 
organizational cultures of the state and counter-state evolve to accept prolonged conflict?  
How can the US effectively administer aid and assistance to either side of an internal war 
when US interests are at stake? 
This project builds upon the current academic study of conflict settlement, which 
deals predominately with asymmetric wars, and provides another perspective for students 
of internal wars to use in analyzing internal wars.  Additionally, this project can assist US 
policy makers in making decisions concerning if and how the US administers foreign aid 
and assistance in countries faced with prolonged internal wars.  The actors involved in 
internal wars can use this research to assist in altering their respective strategies to obtain 
results that are more desirable.   
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III. PROLONGED INTERNAL WAR CASE STUDIES  
A. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY 
 
Figure 3. Map of Philippines (From: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) 
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Under your concept of my duties as Secretary of National Defense, my job 
is to just go on killing Huk. But you must realize that we cannot solve the 
problem of dissidence simply by military measures. It would be futile to go 
on killing Huk, while the Administration continues to breed dissidence by 
neglecting the problems of our masses 
—excerpt from Ramon Magsaysay’s letter of resignation from his post as 
the Philippine’s Secretary of National Defense prior to announcing his 
candidacy for president in 1951, as cited in Aprey.29 
1. Living with Internal War 
For much of the 20th century, the Republic of the Philippines has suffered from 
prolonged periods of armed conflict.  In its most recent history, the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has struggled for nearly 40 years to suppress both a 
communist revolutionary insurgency with influence throughout the country and an 
Islamic separatist insurgency concentrated in the southern part of the country.  The 
relative strengths (political, economic, and military) of the GRP and their opponents have 
ebbed and flowed over the course of both insurgencies with no clear winners in either 
conflict.  Although the people of the Philippines have experienced seemingly continuous 
cycles of armed struggles, their daily lives persist in the midst of internal wars.  Armed 
conflict in the Philippines has achieved a level of systemic embeddedness that is almost 
taken for granted, but also takes on a life of its own and is grounded in both the deeper 
structural dynamics of the country’s historical political economy and in the socio-cultural 
order.  This case study traces the history of rebellion in the Philippines to the current 
threat of the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed branch of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP), and attempts to explain how and why the GRP has lived with, fought 
against, and come to accept the prolonged period of conflict with the NPA, with little or 
no expectation of completely defeating the NPA at any time in the foreseeable future.      
2. Revolutionary History of the Philippines  
Western historians credit Spain with discovering the Philippine islands when 
Ferdinand Magellan landed at Samar and subsequently Cebu in 1521.  Magellan, after 
                                                 
29 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975): 758. 
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proselytizing several hundred Cebuano natives in the Christian faith, died at the hands of 
Rajah Lapulapu, a rival of the Cebuanos, in the Battle of Mactan on April 27, 1521.30  It 
was not until more than 40 years later, in 1565, that Spain established its first permanent 
settlement in Cebu and continued what Magellan had started, converting the indigenous 
people to Roman Catholicism.31  At least two centuries prior to the Spanish settlement of 
the Philippine islands, Muslim traders brought Islam to what is now Mindanao, the 
southernmost island group in the Philippines.32  For the next 300 years, Spain developed 
the Philippines as a colony, using religion as a bond of cohesion between them and the 
indigenous peoples of the Philippines, for the most part leaving the already Muslim 
southern island group of Mindanao alone.   
Toward the later part of Spain’s rule, a relatively wealthy class of mixed half 
Chinese-half Filipino33 began to emerge and more importantly began to seek education at 
foreign (predominately European) universities.  This educated class of Chinese-Filipinos, 
known as Ilustrados, or enlightened ones, employed their liberal Western education to 
challenge “the more despotic aspects of Spanish colonial rule.”34  Toward the later part of 
the 19th century, Spain began experiencing a serious threat to its rule of the Philippines.  
The Ilustrados, most notably Jose Rizal, challenged Spain’s subjugation of the 
Philippines with his writing on the most serious issues of his time, nationalism and 
political reform.  Spain took a heavy-handed approach to Rizal’s dissension by promptly 
arresting and executing him.  In the aftermath of Rizal’s death, Andres Bonifacio and 
 
 
                                                 
30 Juan J. Bautista, “An Archipelago Twice ‘Discovered’: The Santo Nino in the Discourse of 
Discovery,” Asian Studies Review 29 (2005): 187–2006. 
31 Clinton Fernandes, “The Philippines,” in Hot Spot Asia and Oceania (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 2008), 183–199. 
32 Ricardo C. Morales, Perpetual Wars: The Philippine Insurgencies, (Unpublished master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2003). 
33 Chinese immigration to the Philippines increased in the 19th century; however, Chinese-mestizos 
made up approximately 5percent of the population at the beginning of the 19th century.  Source: Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress Philippines Country Study http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/phtoc.html 
(accessed 27 October 2009). 
34 Clinton Fernandes, “The Philippines,” in Hot Spot Asia and Oceania, 183–199 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008): 184. 
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others continued what Rizal helped establish in the Association of the Sons of the People 
(Katipunan) and commenced a revolutionary uprising against Spanish colonialism in 
August 1896.35 
Bonifacio’s leadership of the Katipunan was short-lived.  Another rebel leader 
named Emilio Aguinaldo challenged Bonifacio’s ability to fight the Spaniards and 
discredited Bonifacio because of his familial ties as a provincial landowner (essentially, a 
higher class Filipino than Bonifacio).  Spain eventually succeeded in routing the 
Katipunan rebellion, and Aguinaldo agreed to end his operations in exchange for “exile in 
Hong Kong and a financial settlement.”36  While Aguinaldo accepted exile in Hong 
Kong, other elements of the rebellion continued their fight against Spanish imperialism.   
In 1898, the United States and Spain went to war over Cuban independence, 
beginning the Spanish-American War.  The U.S. continued the war against Spain in the 
Philippines and employed Aguinaldo to assist in routing the Spaniards from the islands.  
Spain sold the Philippines to the U.S. at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War and 
afterward, Aguinaldo brought his nationalist rebellion against the U.S. occupation.37  
From 1899–1902, the U.S. successfully suppressed Aguinaldo’s guerrilla forces, 
employing a “coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression, 
winning over the Filipino population and punishing those who resisted.”38   
The U.S. occupation of the Philippines in the early 20th century brought with it 
numerous benefits and some lasting negative consequences.  During the war, the U.S., as 
part of its conciliation and appeasement of the Filipinos, began an unprecedented period 
of development in the country via civic action and social reform.  Brian M. Linn, in his 
comprehensive narrative of the war, states, “even while engaged in combat operations, 
                                                 
35 Fernandes, “The Philippines,” 184. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, “Philippines Country Study,” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/phtoc.html (accessed October 27, 2009). 
38 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2000): 323.  
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soldiers built schools and sanitation systems, roads and bridges, and brought to many a 
village the first law and the first peace it had known in years.”39   
In the post-war period, however, the Ilustrados were able to maintain their 
disproportionate land holdings as the U.S. relied increasingly on them for administration 
of the islands.  As U.S. consumption of Philippine agrarian exports increased, partly due 
to the U.S. not taxing imports from the Philippines, Filipino landowners reaped great 
financial benefits.  The financial upsurge brought with it further development of the 
Philippines and simultaneously increased the economic cleavage between the landowners 
and the peasants.  Out of this economic/class disparity, peasant uprisings became 
increasingly more prevalent under the influence of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas 
(PKP), or Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).40  Minor social reforms, though not 
significant enough to compose a lasting solution to peasant grievances, came about in the 
1930s, after the Sakdal uprising in protest of the Catholic Church’s massive land-
holdings and its relationship with Filipino landlords.   
In the wake of the Great Depression, “U.S. domestic opinion was moving against 
a formal colonial relationship with the Philippines.”41  The U.S. established the date for 
Filipino independence as July 4, 1946, under the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933 and 
the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934.  While an end to a combined four centuries of 
colonialism under Spain and the U.S. was in sight for the Philippines, the deeper issues of 
solving the internal social crisis among the Filipinos themselves would be put on hold to 
resist yet a third major foreign occupier, Japan, during World War II.   
A few hours after the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese 
invaded the Philippines.  Just three months later, in March of 1942, General Douglass 
McArthur, overwhelmed by the Japanese invasion, escaped the Philippines, leaving a 
significant number of his forces behind, some falling into the hands of the Japanese.  
During their takeover, the Japanese co-opted many Filipinos to help with the civil 
                                                 
39 McAllister Linn, The Philippine War 189–-1902, 327.  
40 Clinton Fernandes, “The Philippines,” in Hot Spot Asia and Oceania, 183–199 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008): 185.  
41 Ibid., 186.  
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administration of the islands, while others, in the spirit of the Filipino’s heritage of 
resistance to occupation, readily and ably began guerrilla operations to harass and destroy 
Japanese forces.  Robert B. Asprey, in War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History 
Volume I, explains that, “about fifty guerrilla groups emerged in the islands before the 
Japanese even consolidated their conquest, and a surprising number of these survived and 
prospered.”42  U.S. soldiers, who stayed behind to build resistance organizations, assisted 
many of the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups throughout the Japanese occupation and 
proved essential in creating the conditions necessary for the eventual return of U.S. 
conventional forces and defeat of the Japanese.  One of the guerrilla groups, with sparse 
support from the U.S., had the CPP as its center and formed the Hukbong Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon (People’s Army Against the Japanese, Hukbalahap or simply Huks).  The Huks 
proved a formidable enemy to the Japanese and would later prove to be a formidable 
opponent of the GRP after the Philippines gained independence in 1946.  Asprey argues 
that the Japanese occupation and liberation by the U.S. during World War II left the 
Philippines in appalling condition, with over a million Filipinos killed, hundreds of 
thousands wounded, and millions homeless and hungry.43   
World War II left the Philippines in disarray, not just from the point of view of 
physical war damage, but also with the splintered political framework left behind by the 
Japanese occupation and wartime collaborators.44  U.S. reconstruction efforts led by 
General McArthur were widely popular, and coupled with the pending independence of 
the Philippines from the U.S., ensured a temporary respite from Filipino revolutionaries.  
The Communist Huks maintained the semblance of a guerrilla organization, while the 
CPP sought resolution to its social reform grievances through political means.  True 
democratic independence did not solve the root problem of the exploitation of Filipino 
peasants by wealthy landholders; wealthy landholders simply took over control in the 
model of 400 years of Spanish and U.S. rule.  The inability of the GRP to adapt to the 
                                                 
42 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume I (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975): 514. 
43 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975): 746. 
44 Ibid. 
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demands of a disgruntled peasant population spurned the rise of the post-war Huks.  
Initially the GRP dealt inefficiently with the growing communist insurgency.   
The Philippine government was still in the process of building and reorganizing 
its security forces while the politicians failed to adopt effective legislation to undermine 
the communist cause.  Government security forces took a heavy-handed approach toward 
the insurgents with little regard for collateral damage or human rights, effectively driving 
the Huks’ recruiting effort.  After four years of ineffective counters to the Huks and the 
Huks continuing to gain strength, President Elpidio Quirino appointed former 
Congressman Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of National Defense in 1950.45   
Magsaysay, a guerrilla commander during World War II, who rose to the highest 
levels of government from humble beginnings, understood the plight of the Filipino 
masses.46  With modest support from U.S. military advisors, Magsaysay used his 
influence in the Philippine government and military to turn the tide of popular support for 
the Huk Rebellion.  Magsaysay stomped out corruption and human rights abuses within 
the military ranks and produced the climate that the government existed to protect the 
people, not exploit citizens for personal gain.  The combined threat of the Huk Rebellion 
and Magsaysay’s reform of the security forces approach to countering the Huks paved the 
way for government reform.   
One of Magsaysay’s most notable coups against the Huks was his implementation 
of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR).  At the heart of the EDCOR program 
was the opportunity for training and resettlement of surrendered Huks to undeveloped 
regions in Mindanao, essentially defeating the Huks rallying cry of “Land for the 
Landless.”  Many Huks cited EDCOR as their main reason for surrender: “Of the overall 
total of 25,000 Filipinos who fought in Huk ranks in the 1950-55 period [sic], Philippine 
Army records show that 6,875 Huks were killed and 4,702 were captured, while in the 
same period 9,458 Huks surrendered! [sic] The remainder stayed at large.”47  Ed 
                                                 
45 Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II, 757. 
46 Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), Chapter 3 “With Magsaysay.” 
47 Ibid., 50–51.  
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Lansdale, who was Magsaysay’s principal U.S. advisor at the time, claims that the 
popularity of the EDCOR program quickly spread to Malaya, where the British were 
fighting another communist insurgency.48  Lansdale says that, “the back of the Huks’ 
‘armed struggle’ was broken in November 1951,” when the armed forces and the people 
truly came together and a free and fair congressional election took place.49  Two years 
later, Ramon Magsaysay won the Philippine Presidential election in another honest, 
democratic and fair vote, effectively ending support for the Huks.  
3. Birth and Growth of the New People’s Army  
For nearly a decade after the Huk Rebellion, the Philippines prospered in relative 
peace and economic development.  Toward the end of the 1960s, during the first 
presidential term of Ferdinand Marcos, the time came for the Philippines to begin 
repayment of their foreign debt, which caused a decline in the Philippine economy.50  It 
was also during this time that the U.S. was fighting their war in Vietnam, the civil rights 
movement was in full swing in the U.S., and Marxist-socialist movements were spreading 
throughout many developing countries.51  These conditions, arguably, contributed to the 
appeal among many Filipinos for a popular mass-based political movement.  
The New People’s Army rose as the guerrilla arm of a new Philippine communist 
party in 1969, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).  Disgruntled with the 
inadequate political gains of the original communist party in the Philippines, the PKP, 
Jose Maria Sison organized an insurgency based almost entirely on Mao’s doctrine of 
peasant-based mass revolution.52  The insurgency sought to take control of the 
government through a three phase strategy: beginning with the “strategic defensive” stage 
in which the CPP/NPA would build a rural mass base of support engaging the AFP on a 
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limited scale, progressing to the “strategic stalemate” stage in which the CPP/NPA would 
be able to directly challenge the AFP for control of the country, and finally moving to the 
“strategic offensive” stage in which the CPP/NPA would possess the strength to seize 
control of the government.53  With a strong strategic framework for protracted warfare, 
the CPP/NPA capitalized on the political situation in the Philippines to build their 
movement.    
Sison, who at the time was a professor at the University of the Philippines, used 
growing peasant unrest, Philippine nationalism (stoked by the presence of U.S. military 
bases in the Philippines), and growing political activism to form the base of his 
revolution.54  Ideologically, Sison adhered strictly to Maoist principals, first radicalizing 
his cadres in the urban center of Manila before sending them into the rural provinces to 
link up with and organize peasant rebels.  Political activism came to a head after Marcos 
won his re-election bid in 1969, which many viewed as a corrupt and fraudulent election.   
4. The Marcos Era and the CPP’s Adherence to Protracted Warfare  
A series of violent protests, riots, and civil unrest, known as the “First Quarter 
Storm,” occurred in Manila from January to March 1970 after Marcos’ state of the nation 
address.55  The “First Quarter Storm” provided fuel to Sison’s ideological fire; open 
discontent with the Marcos regime increased the pool of recruits available to form cadres 
for the CPP and NPA.  In 1971, the NPA continued its drive of increasing opposition to 
the Marcos government by bombing a Liberal party political rally in Manila, which was 
held in preparation for upcoming congressional elections.  Marcos blamed the “Plaza 
Miranda Bombing,” on the communists, while many opponents of the president believed 
he was the one who ordered the attack.56  Regardless of who ordered the bombing, the 
result was increased skepticism in the Philippine political system in general and President 
Marcos in particular.  Despite the relatively small number of armed NPA fighting in the 
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countryside during the early 1970s, the CPP’s role in the “First Quarter Storm” and the 
“Plaza Miranda Bombing” laid a solid strategic foundation for the CPP/NPA, with an 
ever-increasing dissension of the Philippine lower and middle classes from the political 
elite.  Sison fulfilled his strategic coup when Marcos declared martial law in 1972.  Greg 
Jones asserts in Red Revolution:  
The bombing considerably widened the gap separating Marcos from his 
moderate opponents, thus pushing the president further to the authoritarian 
Right and his opponents to the Left.  The suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus and the accompanying repression that followed the bombing also 
pushed many liberals into alliances with the communist underground and 
at the same time opened the door to systematic military abuses against 
citizenry, particularly in the countryside.  Martial law brought wholesale 
state repression and forced into the communist movement many young 
Filipinos who otherwise might never have joined.57          
As Sison solidified the base of the CPP/NPA, he began expanding the 
revolutionary movement to other agriculturally based islands throughout the Philippines 
and founded the CPP/NPA’s overt political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF), 
in 1972.  Sison implemented his strategy through a centralized committee leadership of 
the CPP with decentralized operations conducted by the NPA throughout the Philippines 
and the NDF providing political cover operating with various front organizations in 
Manila.  Through much of the 1970s, the NPA’s strength grew slowly, while from 1967-
1977, Marcos more than tripled the strength of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) from 45,000 to 167,000 members.58    
One of the main problems for the Philippine government, indirectly related to 
martial law, was the level of corruption and human rights abuses conducted by AFP units 
as they fought against the NPA.  Government forces reverted to the heavy-handed types 
of activities unsuccessfully used in fighting the Huk communists in the early years of that 
rebellion.59  The Marcos regime failed to address the root problems of the communist 
insurgency, the same problems plaguing the Philippines since colonial times: widespread 
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land and social inequalities and repression by the government.  With Marcos and the AFP 
continuing to drive a wedge between the government and the average Filipino, the 
CPP/NPA rapidly gained support in the early to mid-1980s.  The NPA focused 
predominately on using small unit, guerrilla tactics against vulnerable AFP outposts to 
increase its arms supply and move into rural communities where government influence 
was non-existent.60  Urban terrorism was an afterthought to the CPP/NPA, as Sison 
believed in the ultimate effectiveness of building massive popular support in rural areas 
first, surrounding the urban centers, and then seizing control of the government when 
they possessed the strength to directly engage and defeat the AFP.  The NPA drove 
recruitment by offering basic services, helping organize communities to become more 
efficient socially, and lecturing on the abundance of government corruption and social 
inequality.  Following Maoist principles, the NPA adhered to the protracted approach of 
insurgency, with only two major events (the First Quarter Storm and the Plaza Miranda 
Bombing) taking place in the Philippines’ capital city until 1983.       
5. Fall of Marcos: Peak and Decline of the CPP/NPA  
In 1983, military conspirators assassinated Benigno Aquino Jr., a liberal political 
opponent of Marcos who had ties to the ideological Left, as he returned from exile in the 
U.S.  As in the case of the “Plaza Miranda” bombing of 1971, Marcos blamed the 
communists for killing Aquino, while the communists blamed the Marcos regime.  
Though an independent commission indicted several high-ranking members of the AFP 
for the Aquino assassination, it is still uncertain who ordered the killing.61  Aquino’s 
death led to further political unrest in the Philippines as CPP/NPA strength continued to 
rise.  In an attempt to ease the political turmoil, Marcos called for a “snap election” in 
1986 after 14 years of martial law.62  The political opposition to Marcos chose Corazon 
Aquino, Benigno’s widow who had no prior political experience, to run against President 
                                                 
60 Jones, Red Revolution, 96–97.   
61 Clinton Fernandes, “The Philippines,” in Hot Spot Asia and Oceania, 183–199 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008): 189. 
62 Fernandes, “The Philippines,” Marcos officially lifted martial law in January 1981, though this was 
largely viewed as only a political maneuver and made little difference in the amount of social control the 
government maintained. 189.  
 28
Marcos.  Both parties declared themselves winner in the election, effectively dividing the 
country and the military in half with the incumbent Marcos maintaining control.  Aquino 
supporters, including the Minister for Defense and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFP, 
took to the streets shortly after the contested election, sparking the EDSA People’s Power 
Revolution of 1986.  The revolution forced the removal of Marcos from office on the day 
of his inauguration and thrust Corazon Aquino into the presidency.63     
Prior to the ousting of Marcos in 1986, dissension developed within the CPP/NPA 
over the proper strategy to employ to achieve the group’s revolutionary goals.  The 
“Rejectionists” argued for creating a revolutionary situation by staging strikes and 
conducting urban terrorism.64  The “Reaffirmists” wanted to maintain the protracted 
approach to the communist insurgency that served as the model for the movement from 
the beginning.65  The results of the strategic debate between the Rejectionists and the 
Reaffirmists was a brief increase in urban terrorism and violence in general in Manila and 
the eventual creation of splinter communist groups; however, the preponderance of NPA 
terror remained in the rural areas during the rift and remains rural-based to this day.  NPA 
guerrilla fronts, the politico-military geographical unit of the NPA, continue to conduct 
“people’s courts” to administer revolutionary justice for various crimes that Philippine 
Security Forces (PSF) cannot affect or are slow to prosecute through the Philippine 
justice system.  The NPA also collect “taxes” from individuals, businesses, and political 
candidates, often resorting to sabotage, arson, and execution when taxes are not paid.66   
The level of communist insurgent violence (armed incidents) throughout the Philippines 
corresponds directly with the strength of the NPA, as indicated by Table 1, and remains 
predominately in areas where PSF have little or no control.  Table 1 also shows the 
consistency of the NPA’s protracted approach to revolution, making slow gains against 
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the government as the social-political environment permits and building their popular 
support base before attempting to openly challenge the AFP.  
  
 
Table 1.   AFP and NPA Statistics, 1970–2004. 67   
By 1987 and 1988, at their peak strength, the NPA felt that it was on the verge of 
being able to progress from the strategic defensive phase, in which it built its mass bases, 
of the insurgency to the strategic stalemate phase, in which it would expand guerrilla 
warfare on a scale capable of directly challenging government forces.68  Justus Van Der 
Kroef explains: 
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For example, after a wave of NPA ambushes of military units and 
assassinations of officials and civilians by NPA death squads (usually 
dubbed ‘Sparrows’) in various cities, particularly Manila, a spokesman for 
the ‘Christians for National Liberation,’ a front group identified with the 
NPA, declared that the communist insurgency was ‘entering the threshold 
of the strategic stalemate’ with the government.69 
Estimates of CPP/NPA operational control in the Philippines during this period reach as 
high as 20 percent of barangays (the lowest level of governance in the Philippines) with 
some degree of influence in all 73 provinces.70  As the strength of the CPP/NPA grew to 
the point of posing a serious challenge for control of the Philippines, the GRP responded 
to the threat with fundamental changes within the government.    
Several factors prevented the CPP/NPA from expanding their movement beyond 
the strategic defensive at the peak of the insurgency in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The CPP boycotted Marcos’ snap election in 1986, not anticipating Aquino’s victory and 
resulting popularity, leading many CPP/NPA members to desert the movement.  
President Aquino was instrumental in implementing numerous government reforms, 
beginning a lengthy process of strategically and indirectly undermining support for the 
CPP and NPA and rebuilding the Republic of the Philippines.  President Aquino restored 
habeas corpus, established a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution, and 
established a commission to investigate Marcos-era human rights violations, all while 
facing six attempted military coups by Marcos supporters.  The new constitution 
prohibited foreign military bases on Filipino territory, undermining the CPP’s nationalist-
based sovereignty grievance when the U.S. turned over its last bases in 1991.71  The GRP 
passed the marginally effective Comprehensive Land Reform Law to help address 
peasant-equality grievances.72  President Aquino released political prisoners and 
attempted to negotiate with the CPP for peace, causing further dissension within the 
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CPP/NPA.  The general collapse of communism internationally served to partially erode 
the ideological base of the CPP/NPA.73  Finally, the rift in the CPP that began in the early 
1980s between the Rejectionists and Reaffirmists came to a head with the Revolutionary 
Proletarian Army and the Alex Boncayao Brigade splintering from the CPP/NPA and 
weakening the overall unity of the communist movement.74  As quickly as the 
CPP/NPA’s strength grew in the 1980s, it shrank due to a number of factors relating to 
government reform and the removal of the Marcos dictatorship.    
6. Continued Protraction of the CPP/NPA Fight 
President Aquino’s successor, President Fidel Ramos, continued the rebuilding 
process, restoring a semblance of confidence and legitimacy in the GRP while attempting 
to negotiate with the CPP/NPA.  In 1994, the GRP declared the CPP a legal entity; 
however, in 1999 the peace talks with the CPP were called off.75  Through the late 1990s 
and into the 21st century, the GRP suffered a number of setbacks in its fight against the 
NPA.  In 1998, under newly elected President Joseph Estrada, the Asian financial crisis 
struck a blow to the already struggling Philippine economy, hindering development and 
contributing to a resurgence of the CPP/NPA.76  The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF, a splinter of the Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF separatist movement) 
and the NPA entered into an alliance, while the AFP focused its efforts almost entirely on 
defeating the MILF, creating the physical space necessary for the NPA to expand.77  
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In 2000, President Estrada, “was impeached on charges of bribery, corruption, 
betrayal of public trust, and constitutional violations.”78  Estrada’s successor, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo, has subsequently faced a series of coup attempts and election 
scandals, all of which have underscored the perception of a legitimate central government 
and taken focus off the continued fight against the CPP/NPA.   
In 2002, the U.S. Department of State placed the CPP/NPA on its list of foreign 
terrorist organizations (FTO).  The CPP/NPA’s designation as an FTO has had a negative 
impact on their external funding, forcing the NPA to rely more heavily on terrorism, 
extortion, and revolutionary taxes to continue financing their fight.79  The CPP/NPA 
continues their revolutionary struggle stuck in Mao’s concept of the strategic defensive 
phase of protracted warfare, not quite able to progress into the strategic stalemate phase.  
The GRP and AFP continue attempting to suppress both the communist revolution and 
the Islamic separatist movement in Mindanao while simultaneously attempting to 
marginalize support for the communists through economic development and legitimizing 
perceptions of the government.   
7. Summary of Philippine and CPP/NPA Conflict and Analysis of 
Conflict Duration  
The CPP and its guerrilla arm the NPA have posed a viable threat to GRP security 
for more than 40 years.  Motivated by the success of Mao in China and growing concern 
over the legitimacy of the Marcos government, the CPP/NPA began small by design and 
carefully grew their insurgency outside the reach of the GRP and Manila.  The 
CPP/NPA’s strategic approach of protracted people’s war, maintaining a relatively quiet 
urban political struggle while slowly building a mass peasant base, has given them the 
physical and political space necessary to maintain their fight for so long.  When the 
CPP/NPA did conduct operations in Manila, they always planned their activities to 
achieve maximum second- and third-order effects, provoking harsh government 
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responses and increasing mass dissension from the government.  The CPP/NPA achieved 
significant support from dissatisfied rural peasant farmers, who have demonstrated their 
willingness throughout history to revolt against repressive governments and large, 
exploitative landholders.  The GRP, under the reign of Ferdinand Marcos, played into the 
long-term strategy of the CPP/NPA when Marcos declared martial law and increased the 
size of the AFP by more than 200 percent in the 1970s.  The CPP/NPA’s strategic 
patience vis-a-vis the GRP/AFP led to the peak of NPA strength in the mid 1980s until 
Marcos’ moderate opposition forcibly removed him from power in 1986, thereby 
removing a substantial portion of the CPP/NPA’s political base.  The GRP shifted to a 
more indirect approach of dealing with the CPP/NPA after the fall of Marcos, 
incorporating government reforms in congruence with military enforced security, leading 
initially to a decline in the support and strength of the CPP/NPA.  Unable to achieve 
consistent economic development for the past two decades, fighting two insurgencies 
simultaneously, and facing a reaffirmed CPP/NPA protracted strategy, the GRP has 
struggled to push the staunch members of the CPP/NPA beyond their breaking point.   
Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars 
become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war 
directly affects its will to end the war, and desensitization to violence among the 
participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent 
social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the 
state. 
The location of violence throughout this conflict has remained predominately-
rural based and relatively low due to the protracted strategy employed by the CPP/NPA.  
This level of protraction by the CPP/NPA supports the hypothesis that a central 
government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end 
the war.  The CPP/NPA initially operated in geographic areas of the Philippine 
archipelago that had little or no government influence, out of sight and out of mind for 
the GRP.  Following Maoist doctrine, the CPP/NPA slowly expanded, capitalizing on 
their ability to organize and motivate peasants in ungoverned spaces and at the same time 
leaving symbols of the central government largely untouched.  Occasionally, the 
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CPP/NPA spurned progressive and repressive action from the GRP to meet their 
operational needs, but remained largely a nuisance only to the rural authorities.   
Only when the CPP/NPA reached its peak strength in the mid to late 1980s and 
was on the verge of directly and openly challenging the AFP did the GRP go through the 
political changes required to begin to undermine the CPP/NPA.  This change occurred, 
not as a deliberate decision by the GRP in response to CPP/NPA growth, but as a popular 
movement in Manila expressing an overall dissatisfaction with the corruption and 
ineptitude of the Marcos regime, which had inadvertently contributed to the growth of the 
CPP/NPA.  The EDSA revolution effectively swept away much of the CPP/NPA’s 
political framework and the Aquino administration kept debasing it with wide 
government reforms.  Prior to the EDSA revolution, the general Filipino population had 
no middle ground for choice between Marcos and the CPP/NPA.  Under the popular 
President Aquino, the GRP’s negotiating position strengthened vis-à-vis the hardcore 
CPP/NPA, allowing demobilization and subsequent fractionalization of some CPP/NPA 
members.  Essentially, the citizens of Manila chose the middle ground, Aquino, from the 
radical left in the CPP/NPA or the radical right in Marcos.  When the CPP/NPA’s 
strength receded, the GRP gradually shifted resources toward handling other pressing 
issues, notably the MILF and the Asian financial crisis, thereby relieving pressure from 
the CPP/NPA and enabling them to slowly expand again.  The CPP/NPA appears to have 
learned from past mistakes to control their use of violence, maintain their viability as an 
organization, and still not cause enough concern for the GRP to direct a whole of 
government approach to ending the insurgency.   
Desensitization to violence among the participants in this war should be viewed in 
the context of the Philippines’ revolutionary history, which has numerous examples of 
weak actors vying to overthrow the central government in order to improve their lives.  
One possible argument is that the violent history of challenging authority in the 
Philippines has made it consciously easier for the CPP/NPA, or potentially any insurgent 
minded group, to continue their struggle over time and easier for disenfranchised sections 
of the population to support the movement.  The political will of the CPP/NPA has been 
strengthened over time because of their protracted use of violence to challenge the GRP.  
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The history of rebellion in general and communist rebellion in particular in the 
Philippines has also made the CPP/NPA less willing to make concessions within their 
strategic goal of overthrowing the government.  This combination of factors has created a 
level of acceptable violence among the actors of the conflict.  Purely in terms of a 
cost/benefit rational, with violence as the cost and political gain as the benefit, both the 
GRP and the CPP/NPA have gradually accepted higher costs over time without yielding 
much in the way of benefits.  As long as the CPP/NPA remains within the threshold of 
acceptable violence, then they should be able to maintain their movement indefinitely; 
their only limiting factor is patience, which they have demonstrated they possess over the 
past 40 years.  
Fighting two insurgencies (along with various factional offshoots) 
simultaneously, the GRP has adapted to maintain military pressure on the rebel groups 
while attempting to provide for the needs of its people, seemingly accepting the conflicts, 
unable to achieve a complete victory in either case.  In the absence of official government 
security, a rural population has little choice but to accept the presence and control of an 
armed and cohesive group that provides some semblance of government services such as 
the CPP/NPA, leaving the GRP to either physically and politically displace the CPP/NPA 
or hope that the CPP/NPA self destructs.  
Both the GRP and the CPP/NPA appear to have accepted the terms of their war 
against each other with neither side willing to make significant concessions.  The 
CPP/NPA, through 40 years of armed struggle, and the GRP, with their suppression of 
the CPP/NPA, have established a balance of control in the Philippines with neither side 
able to achieve their objectives using their available resources.  With respect to the 
myriad issues facing the GRP, it has ultimately demonstrated through its actions/inactions 
that the state of the conflict with the CPP/NPA is acceptable.  If the CPP/NPA ever grow 
to the point or pose the same level of threat that they did in the late 1980s, then the GRP 
will likely adapt to overcome the threat, diverting resources from other pressing 
problems, and once again suppressing the insurgency to an acceptable level.  The NPA’s 
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization has hurt its external resource base and 
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arguably their movement as a whole, giving the GRP an advantage if it can obtain the 
outside resources necessary to help increase the government’s legitimacy and assist with 
effective internal development and security.   
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B. SRI LANKA AND THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM 
 




I understand the dignity of a life, but our right is much more dignified than 
life, our freedom, and our self-respect. 
 – Velupillai Prabhakaran, founder of the LTTE.80  
1. Significance of the Sri Lankan Civil War 
Embroiled in an ethnically based civil war since the 1970s, the story of Sri Lanka, 
an island nation of approximately 20 million people off the southeast coast of India, 
serves as an excellent case for the study of prolonged internal wars.  The Sri Lankan Civil 
War has caused at least 70,000 deaths and several hundred thousand displaced civilians in 
more than 25 years of conflict.81  Rooted in ethnic divisions encouraged by their colonial 
rulers, the conflict between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils has demonstrated 
ruthless tactics employed by both sides and a will to employ violence to defend their 
respective interests so strong that neither side would accept a negotiated settlement to end 
the war.  The determined struggle of the Tamils to achieve a Tamil state within Sri Lanka 
and the Sinhalese to counter the Tamils for fear of their own marginalization by India has 
led to a humanitarian crisis of yet unknown proportions.82  What are the underlying 
conditions that led the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to sustain their civil war for so long?   
2. Roots of the Conflict 
Prior to colonization by European imperialists, Sri Lanka dates its Sinhalese 
Buddhist tradition to 500 B.C., while the Tamils trace their Sri Lankan heritage to 300 
B.C.83  Objective historians attribute early conflict on the island of Sri Lanka to dynastic 
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rather than ethnocentric causes; however, centuries of sporadic fighting, interference 
from India, and a suspected outbreak of disease eventually led to an ethnic, religious, and 
geographic division between the Hindu Tamils in the north and the Buddhist Sinhalese in 
the south.84  In the 1500s, Portuguese sailors landed on what was then called Ceylon 
(Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka in 1972)85 and after several hundred years of 
colonial rule by Portugal, the Netherlands, and finally the British Empire, Ceylon 
peacefully gained independence in 1948.86 
While under British rule, the Tamils occupied various administrative positions 
and received preferential status from their colonial bosses.87 According to Imtiyaz and 
Stavis, colonial rulers often favored particular minority groups to help with 
administrative functions, as a minority group could be more trusted by an outside power 
and in general easier for the occupier to control.  In granting Ceylon its independence in 
1948, Britain established it as a unitary state vice a federation, ignoring the island’s 
separate ethnic compositions, effectively leaving the political fate of Ceylon to the 
Sinhalese majority.88  With independence from Britain, the Tamils found themselves in a 
political battle against displacement at the hands of the majority Sinhalese (Tamils make 
up approximately 18 percent of the Sri Lankan population while Sinhalese comprise 
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Tamil Nadu in India.  Comprising more than 50 million Indian Tamils a few miles across 
the Palk Straight from northern Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu creates a persistent threat to 
Sinhalese sovereignty.90   
In 1956, the pro-Buddhist and pro-Sinhalese Sri Lankan Freedom Party won the 
national elections and passed the Sinhala Only Language Act, replacing English as the 
official language used in state and public affairs.91  This act discriminated against Tamil 
speakers and favored the Sinhalese majority.  After rioting, the act was rescinded in 1958. 
Further policies in favor of Sinhalese were passed in 1972, including policies that 
lowered education standards for Sinhalese students entering Science and Medicine 
schools and the Constitution of 1972, which gave a special status to Buddhism in state 
and public sectors.92  Imtiyaz and Stavis argue that the policies preferential to Sinhalese 
were designed to satisfy Sinhalese voters, “creating an environment of distrust between 
the Sinhalese and Tamils.”93  Imtiyaz and Stavis proceed to point out that, “Scholarly 
works on the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict suggest that communal riots in 1958, 1961, 1974, 
1977, and 1983 in which Tamils were killed, maimed, robbed, and rendered homeless 
were carefully designed by the Sinhala elites.  This persistent pattern of violence set the 
stage for violent Tamil retaliation and efforts to secede.”94 
As Sinhalese policy continued to discriminate against ethnic Tamils in politics, 
education, and government employment opportunities, Tamils began calling for their 
autonomy.  Throughout the 1970s, numerous Tamil organizations emerged to campaign 
for equality.  The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) sought to create a separate 
Tamil state through constitutional means while other Tamil moderates sought only their 
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autonomy within the state of Sri Lanka and their basic rights under the government.  The 
Tamils never took a completely unified stance with respect to their goals.  Political means 
proved ineffective at breaking the Sinhalese monopoly in Sri Lankan politics leading to a 
rise in militant Tamil groups.  These Tamil groups viewed violence as necessary to 
defend Tamil rights and interests in Sri Lanka.95   
In 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran took over the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) when 
GoSL authorities arrested the TNT’s former leader.  Prabhakaran renamed the TNT the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and consolidated several Tamil groups into the 
LTTE.96  Militant Tamil groups gradually demonstrated their opposition to Sinhalese 
hegemony through violent acts against the state, culminating in 1983, when the LTTE 
killed 13 Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldiers, sparking major anti-Tamil riots.97  
The LTTE attack on the SLA soldiers and the subsequent anti-Tamil riots marks 
the official start of the Sri Lankan Civil War,98 though the violent Tamil insurgency 
began several years earlier.   
3. The First Eelam War, 1983–1987 
During the 1983 riots, Sinhalese rioters killed an estimated 2,000–3,000 Tamils 
and displaced many tens of thousands more.  Imtiyaz and Stavis cite Human Rights 
Watch as claiming the GoSL sponsored the anti-Tamil riots and accused Sinhala 
politicians of “institutionalized anti-Tamil violence and atrocities.”99  At this point in the 
war, after escalation by militant Tamil groups and indiscriminate reprisals from the 
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Sinhalese majority, both sides viewed violence as the only solution to settle the ethnic 
divide.  The Tamils also began receiving international sympathy due to apparent human 
rights abuses by the SLA.100  
Apart from a brief attempt at peace negotiations in 1985 in which the LTTE 
forced all Tamil parties to walk out of the talks, the LTTE took a hard line stance against 
moderate Tamil groups, murdering many Tamil politicians who did not subscribe to their 
agenda.101  From 1983–1987, the LTTE ruthlessly demonstrated its resolve to obtain a 
Tamil state by attacking Sri Lankan military, police, and civilians, targeting military 
leadership and civilian transportation infrastructure.102   
Throughout the period 1983–1987, in addition to growing their insurgency, the 
LTTE made significant gains in its strength and external base of support.  India and the 
Tamil Nadu state government helped the LTTE expand (equipment and capabilities)103 
with additional financial support provided by a Tamil Diaspora of 500,000 who fled Sri 
Lanka seeking political asylum in India and the West.104 
In 1986, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi reversed India’s national stance of 
support to the Tamils by expelling 1,000 members of the LTTE from Tamil Nadu and 
banning the local government from providing further sanctuary for the LTTE.  In 1987, 
as LTTE terror continued to rise, the resolve of the GoSL to defeat the LTTE peaked as 
demonstrated by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) mounting a full scale, direct 
attack against the LTTE to root them from the Tamil occupied provinces in the north and 
east of Sri Lanka.105  The SLAF gained control of most of the LTTE strongholds through 
heavy bombing and direct assaults, leading to further accusations (and LTTE 
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propaganda) of state-sponsored terror conducted by the SLAF and some degree of 
international sympathy for the Tamils.  In another reversal of the Indian stance toward the 
LTTE, India, with pressure from Tamil Nadu, sent humanitarian relief supplies in a show 
of support for the Sri Lankan Tamils and a sign of contempt with the GoSL.  Shortly after 
the arrival of humanitarian relief from India, the LTTE executed its first two successful 
suicide bomb attacks against the SLAF, leading to the SLAF planning to launch a final 
offensive into the LTTE’s traditional stronghold, the Jaffna peninsula.  Prior to the final 
SLAF offensive, India intervened by brokering a deal with the GoSL to end the 
conflict.106  At this early stage in the war, LTTE violence definitely increased, but it was 
an increase of violence in general and not in proximity to Colombo, the capital of Sri 
Lanka, that led to the major offensives taken by the SLAF.   
4. The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, 1987–1990 
From late 1987 through 1990, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which 
eventually reached 80,000 troops, deployed to Sri Lanka to help end the conflict.107  
Despite efforts by all three sides to honor the peace deal, it broke down as mutual trust in 
each of the three parties disintegrated.  The SLAF captured and imprisoned 17 LTTE 
soldiers, the LTTE tortured and killed eight SLAF personnel in retaliation, and the IPKF 
increased its forces after discovering the LTTE was conducting ethnic cleansing 
operations in the northern and eastern provinces.108  The LTTE soon began fighting the 
IPKF, while the GoSL redirected its efforts towards suppressing a left-wing insurgency 
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conducted by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in the south.  At least two sources 
reported that the GoSL provided some support to the LTTE in the LTTE’s fighting 
against the IPKF.109   
As the SLAF battled and eventually suppressed the JVP, the LTTE continued 
their fight against the IPKF.  Prabhakaran negotiated for support from the GoSL playing 
on GoSL fears of too much Indian influence in Sri Lanka.  The LTTE received the 
support from the GoSL President Premdasa despite objections from senior SLAF officers.  
Having stood their ground against the IPKF for three years, the LTTE negotiated a cease-
fire with the IPKF, leading to their withdrawal from Sri Lanka in 1990.  The LTTE 
quickly re-established itself in its home provinces as the IPKF departed.110 
5. The Second Eelam War, 1990–1995 
During the second round of the LTTE’s war for autonomy, they continued to 
grow and increased the stakes with more violence, beginning with the execution of more 
than 600 police officers captured by the LTTE.  The LTTE alienated sympathizers within 
Tamil Nadu through their violent targeting of rival Tamil groups and eventually began 
direct attacks against SLAF camps inflicting heavy casualties.111  As reciprocating 
atrocities increased between the LTTE and the SLAF, Prabhakaran again resorted to the 
employment of suicide bombers to terrorize the GoSL.   
In Colombo, the capital city of Sri Lanka, LTTE commandos killed the SLAF 
Defense Minister with a remote detonated mine.  In 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber was 
responsible for killing former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in part to retaliate for 
damage done by the IPKF and India’s previous withdrawal of support to the LTTE.  The 
assassination of Gandhi led to further alienation of Tamil Nadu from the LTTE, straining 
the LTTE’s covert support network inside of India.112  In 1992, another LTTE suicide 
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attack killed the commander of the SLAF Navy in Colombo113 and yet another LTTE 
suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.114  These 
suicide assassinations and the LTTE’s increasing level of direct attacks against SLAF 
bases, led to a corresponding increase of the GoSL’s resolve to eliminate the LTTE and 
end the conflict.  By the middle of 1994, both the LTTE and SLAF were suffering from 
heavy losses, leading to a decline in offensive operations by both sides.  As attrition took 
its toll on both the SLAF and LTTE, Sri Lanka elected a new president in late 1994.  
President Chandrika Kumaratunga signed a “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” with 
Prabhakaran in January of 1995.115  After four months of a peaceful cease-fire, unknown 
assailants shot and killed two SLAF soldiers (the LTTE denied involvement) and a few 
weeks later, two LTTE suicide scuba diver bombers destroyed two SLAF Navy 
gunboats.116 
6. The Third Eelam War, 1995–2001 
In the third round of major hostilities between the LTTE and the SLAF, the LTTE 
increased the stakes even more by employing surface to air missiles against the SLAF Air 
Force.  The LTTE’s escalation prompted a corresponding increase in defense spending by 
the GoSL.  In heavy fighting, the SLAF attempted to capture the traditional stronghold of 
the LTTE, the Jaffna Peninsula, but the LTTE was able to repulse the SLAF assault.  
Prabhakaran continued the escalation of violence ordering more suicide attacks against 
the SLAF Navy and a government building in Colombo.  Later in 1995, President 
Kumaratunga made another attempt to end the conflict by offering a provision for a 
unified northeastern region of Sri Lanka, under control of Tamils, if the LTTE laid down 
their arms.  Prabhakaran rejected the offer and increased LTTE suicide attacks.117 
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The LTTE hijacked a civilian cruise ship in August of 1995 and from the end of 
1995 to the beginning of 1996, the SLAF forced their way into the Jaffna Peninsula, 
displacing all civilians from the cities and into the jungle.  The third Eelam War saw a 
continuous escalation of violence by both sides with the LTTE bringing the fight closer to 
Colombo and overrunning SLAF Army camps and police stations, an unsuccessful 
assassination attempt against President Kumaratunga, and a truck bomb attack against the 
Buddhist Sacred Temple of the Tooth (said to house a tooth from the Buddha).  In 1997, 
the US placed the LTTE on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and finally, at the 
end of 2000, after six years of brutal fighting both sides broke down and agreed to 
another ceasefire agreement, this time brokered by a Norwegian delegation.118 
A short time later, both sides broke the ceasefire agreement, again leading to 
increased hostilities.  The LTTE conducted an attack at the Colombo International 
Airport, destroying eight SLAF Air Force planes, three civilian planes, and damaging 
five others, crippling Sri Lanka’s tourism industry.119  The war continued until elections 
in December of 2001 helped the GoSL and LTTE return to their ceasefire agreement.  
This time, Prabhakaran compromised on his goal of complete Tamil autonomy and 
offered to settle on a regional autonomy granting the Tamils control over their politics 
and economy.  A few months later on February 22, 2002, the GoSL and LTTE signed the 
Norwegian Peace Accords, withdrawing combat forces behind technical control lines 
monitored by the Norwegian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission.120   
7. The Tamil State, 2002–2005 
As the Norwegian Peace Accord went into effect, the GoSL and LTTE technical 
control lines morphed into borders and the LTTE gradually built a Tamil state.  From 
2002 until 2005, the LTTE maintained control of a Tamil autonomous zone, complete 
with police, a functioning judicial system, social welfare services and economic 
development (in close conjunction with numerous non-governmental organizations), and 
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an external security apparatus in the form of the LTTE, which provided a check against 
the traditional threat imposed by the GoSL and SLAF.121  Kristian Stokke argues in a 
2006 journal article that, “The dominant form of governance embedded in the LTTE state 
institutions is that of a strong and centralized state with few formal institutions for 
democratic representation, but there are also elements of partnership arrangements and 
institutional experiments that may serve as a basis for more democratic forms of 
representation and governance.”122  Despite the potential for a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, 
several factors led to the breakdown of the Norway brokered ceasefire agreement.   
Notably, the question of authorities for development and humanitarian relief in 
Tamil held areas created fear among some Sinhalese politicians of the possible 
institutionalization of power-sharing arrangements between the GoSL and Tamils that 
would undermine the sovereignty of the Sri Lankan unitary state.123  This issue came to a 
head in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, which killed some 30,000 Sri Lankans, when 
disputes erupted over the allocation and flow of relief aid in the Tamil state.124  The 
LTTE used this issue to call for a boycott of the 2005 presidential elections, which 
“assisted in the defeat of the pro-peace candidate and the election of the more belligerent 
Mahinda Rajapaksa.”125 
In March of 2004, the LTTE split.  Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as 
Colonel Karuna, the eastern commander broke away from Prabhakaran, taking more than 
5,000 troops and formed the Tamileela Peoples’ Liberation Tigers (TMVP).  It is likely 
that an internal dispute over finances and Karuna’s perceptions of exploitation of Tamils 
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by the LTTE as a whole led to the split.126  The split turned into open hostilities, with the 
LTTE attacking and disbanding the TMVP, leading many TMVP members into the arms 
of the SLAF, acting as a Tamil militia.127   
Chris Smith, in “The Eelam Endgame?” argues that, “Despite a longstanding 
failure to exercise a monopoly of force across the entire island, the government has 
consistently refused to acknowledge the political realities that follow as a consequence 
and has adopted positions that are increasingly and obviously unacceptable to the 
LTTE.”128  Ultimately, a lack of trust between the LTTE and the GoSL and 
“politicization of the state institution by the Sinhalese leaders”129 led to the final 
breakdown of the ceasefire agreement and a return to full-scale combat between the 
LTTE and the SLAF. 
8. The Fourth Eelam War, 2006–009 
Both the LTTE and the GoSL blamed each other for violations of the ceasefire 
agreement and the consequential return to war.  In August 2005, the LTTE allegedly 
assassinated Sri Lankan foreign minister, Laxman Kadirgamar, an ethnic Tamil who had 
a reputation of lobbying the international community for proscription of the LTTE.130  
On the GoSL side, Smith cites the “introduction of new emergency regulations,” as 
leading to widespread unlawful detentions and disappearances of Tamils,131 adding to the 
long-standing animosity felt between the two sides.  In the early part of 2006, bilateral 
talks in Geneva broke down over accusations of ceasefire violations by both sides and by 
the middle of 2006, approximately 1,000 lives were lost in conflict-related incidents.132 
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The LTTE returned to suicide bombings, killing the third highest-ranking SLAF 
army officer and bringing more violence to Colombo.133  For the GoSL and the SLAF, 
the failure of the ceasefire agreement to last delivered their final opportunity to destroy 
the LTTE.  From 2006–2009, the SLAF brought the full power of the military to bear 
against the LTTE.  Combined with help from Karuna’s breakaway Tamil group and the 
GoSL emergency regulations, which restricted open media coverage and led to countless 
unwarranted detentions, the SLAF militarily defeated the LTTE in 2009, killing as many 
as 20,000 civilians in the final months of the conflict.134  On May 18, 2009, the SLA 
killed Velupillai Prabhakaran and other key LTTE leaders, dealing a crippling blow to the 
LTTE and landing a major coup for the GoSL.135 
It is unclear what the future holds for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.  The SLAF did 
defeat the LTTE on the battlefield; however, in the process they displaced several 
hundred thousand Tamils, holding them in government internment camps, ostensibly 
looking for remaining members of the LTTE.136  As the humanitarian crisis resulting 
from the war unfolds, only time will tell what sort of backlash Sri Lanka will feel from 
the international community and within its borders from the Sri Lankan Tamils.   
9. Summary of Sri Lankan and LTTE Wars and Analysis of Conflict 
Duration 
For more than three decades, the LTTE battled against the GoSL for Tamil 
autonomy.  The LTTE’s insurgency was protracted in the sense that their determination 
to fight never wavered; however, the level of violence the LTTE employed against the 
GoSL quickly escalated during each phase of the conflict.  With each side battling for 
their survival as a group and varying degrees of external support affecting the conflict, 
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neither side was willing to concede their values or goals to the other.  The Sri Lankan 
civil war demonstrates a galvanization of political wills that ultimately brought over 30 
years of violence to Sri Lanka.   
Several factors led to a temporary respite from the ethnic conflict during the First 
Eelam War.  A rise in the JVP insurgency in southern Sri Lanka forced the GoSL to focus 
more attention in the south, intervention from India on behalf of ethnic Tamils put 
political pressure on the GoSL to negotiate with the Tamils, and increased violence 
brought against the GoSL and SLAF by the LTTE all contributed to the temporary 
ceasefire.  After a return to conflict in the Second Eelam War, the LTTE raised the stakes 
of the war with increasing amounts of suicide bombings, assassinations of high-ranking 
political and military figures, and a high level of success when battling the SLAF.  The 
new president of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, sought a ceasefire with the LTTE 
in order to end the violence.  The president offered the LTTE a unified Tamil region if 
they would lay down their arms, but a fundamental lack of trust by the LTTE for the 
GoSL led Prabhakaran to reject the offer.   After another return to war, the LTTE again 
escalated the level of violence and demonstrated their capacity to wage war against the 
GoSL to the point that they lost credibility within much of the international community, 
leading many countries, including the U.S., to list the LTTE as a terrorist organization.  
This time, Norway intervened to negotiate a settlement, bringing the longest period of 
peace to Sri Lanka in more than 20 years. 
As the LTTE built an autonomous Tamil state, disagreements over development, 
sovereignty issues, and accusations of ceasefire violations by both sides led to the fourth 
round of the Sri Lankan civil war.  A new and bellicose Sri Lankan president, a split in 
the LTTE, increased capacity of the SLAF, and a decrease in external support to the 
LTTE led to the declared victory of the GoSL over the LTTE in May 2009.   
Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars 
become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war 




participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent 
social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the 
state.    
When observing the level of violence in each phase of the LTTE war against the 
GoSL, as violence increased in intensity and proximity to Colombo, the GoSL was more 
determined to end the conflict.  The fact that as violence increased in general in Sri 
Lanka, the GoSL took actions to suppress it can also be attributed to the relatively small 
physical size of Sri Lanka.  A violent attack anywhere on the island could cumulatively 
contribute to the political effect of increased will to end the violence.  As LTTE attacks 
increased in general throughout the island and against the SLAF, GoSL resolve to defeat 
the LTTE also increased.  The causal relationship of level of violence to resolve to end 
the conflict was not isolated to the proximity of violence to Colombo, but an increase in 
violence in general compounded the relationship.      
The interaction between the overall level of violence employed by the LTTE and 
the GoSL’s determination to end the conflict shows that during each phase of the war, 
except the last, the LTTE employed more and more violence before the GoSL either 
negotiated a ceasefire or attempted to destroy the LTTE.  In the last phase of the war, it 
appeared that both sides resolved to fight to the end.  Intensity and proximity of violence 
to the center of government directly contributed to the GoSL’s desire to end the fighting, 
again supporting the hypothesis that a central government’s distance from the violence in 
an internal war directly affects its will to end the war.   
As the duration of the war increased, the overall amount of violence between the 
GoSL and LTTE also increased, giving some weight to the idea that levels of socially 
acceptable violence can change over time, but this is apparent only to the degree of 
popular support for both sides to continue fighting.  It is not apparent that either side 
became desensitized to violence in this conflict; however, the fact that it took more 
violence on behalf of the LTTE to bring the GoSL to the point of negotiation or full 
destruction of the LTTE does indicate that the level of acceptable violence increased 
throughout the conflict.  As the war progressed through each cease-fire, the LTTE was 
willing to bear more and more costs in terms of violence to break the will of the GoSL, 
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and it seems that the GoSL viewed the conflict with the same rational.  In order for either 
side to have had legitimate bargaining power to achieve their respective goals, they each 
had to demonstrate an increase in both their willingness to employ more violence and the 
amount of violence they would accept before a ceasefire or surrender.  Although the level 
of acceptable violence for those involved in the Sri Lankan Civil War did increase over 
time, a violent social equilibrium was never reached as demonstrated by the will of both 
sides to continue fighting to the end for their respective interests.  The GoSL and the 
LTTE essentially drove each other into a position of political will dictating a fight to the 
end.  A violent social equilibrium was never achieved in this conflict, the war became an 
all or nothing endeavor. 
In essence, the LTTE never sought a protracted war to achieve their goal of 
secession.  The protraction of the Sri Lankan Civil War appears to be a function of the 
political will of both sides combined with their respective military capacities to continue 
fighting and a progressive increase in the level of acceptable violence throughout each 
phase of the war.    
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C. COLOMBIA AND THE FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE 
COLOMBIA  
 




For there were and are two Colombias.  One, roughly 33 percent of the 
country, is west of the Cordillera Oriental.  Much of this area is high 
country.  It is there that the country’s productive forces are concentrated.  
The other, east of the mountains, the llanos, is savannah, vast plains, and 
amazon, the jungle.  More than 95 percent of the populace lives in the first 
area.  The other 5 percent-minus and key insurgent formations are in the 
second zone.  As long as the guerrillas were revolutionary homesteaders 
in areas no one else wanted, the government bothered with them only 
when their actions forced a response.  It was the job of the police and the 
military, went the logic, to keep an eye on them.  
        – Thomas Marks137   
1. Systemic Armed Conflict in Colombia   
Violence has plagued Colombia throughout its history.  The War of a Thousand 
Days (1899–902), a period of armed rebellion that erupted over a dispute concerning the 
scope of presidential powers, had approximately 100,000 deaths attributed to it.138  La 
Violencia (1948–1958), another period of violence characterized by polarization within 
Colombia’s political system, led to an estimated 200,000 deaths.139  Recent Colombian 
internal conflicts have brought with them a toll of violence that has perforated virtually 
every aspect of Colombian life.   
Over the past four decades a number of armed groups have entrenched themselves 
in the Colombian countryside employing a variety of strategies to promote their political 
agendas with varying degrees of success.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), the National Liberation Army 
(Ejercito de Leberacion Nacional – ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito 
Popular de Liberacion – EPL), and other smaller guerrilla groups all presented a 
challenge to Colombia’s internal security and government stability until the 1990s.  After 
a series of negotiated settlements between the Colombian government and some of the 
prominent guerrilla groups, the FARC emerged as the primary threat to security in 
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Colombia.140  In addition to the traditional guerrilla based armed political challengers, 
since the 1980s, Colombia has dealt increasingly with violence posed by drug cartels.  
Some of these illicit organizations comingle with revolutionary groups, and illegal 
paramilitary groups, notably the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which 
initially emerged as self-defense organizations in response to the threat posed to large 
landowners by the FARC, ELN, and EPL.141  How did Colombia sink into a state of 
affairs where it became the norm, not the exception, for groups to challenge state 
authority through violent means?  This case study examines the FARC specifically and 
other armed non-state actors within Colombia in general to explain how armed conflict 
has persisted, almost without stop, for over 40 years in Colombia.  The Colombian 
Government’s response to violent armed challenges to the state has been proportional to 
the proximity of the violence to the capital city, Bogota.  As long as the violence 
perpetrated by non-state groups remained predominately outside of Colombia’s major 
urban centers and the longer it remained outside, Colombia’s resolve to defeat or 
negotiate with these groups remained low.   
2. Origins of the FARC and Its War in Colombia 
The FARC dates its founding to 1964;142 however, the roots of the FARC’s 
opposition to the Colombian state are intertwined in Colombia’s democratic history.  
With independence from Spain in the early 19th century, Colombia became one of the 
strongest democracies in Latin America.143  The two dominant political parties, the 
Liberals and the Conservatives, have served as the impetus of conflict in Colombia from 
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the 1860s onward.  Extremists from both political parties have clashed over issues 
ranging from the scope of executive powers to the position of the Roman Catholic 
Church in state affairs.144  Violent local conflicts raged on and off until the War of a 
Thousand Days forced moderates from both parties to agree that cooperation would best 
serve the interests of Colombia.  In 1930, liberal reformists instituted the “Revolution of 
March,” which included agrarian reform, support for labor unions, and the enactment of 
public assistance.145  These reforms gradually drove the two political parties further apart 
culminating with the assassination of a Liberal party politician named Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan in April 1948.  Gaitan’s assassination sparked a riot in Bogota that eventually 
spread throughout much of rural Colombia beginning the period in Colombia’s history 
known as La Violencia.  In 1958, the Liberals and Conservatives began cooperating once 
again, establishing a power sharing arrangement under the National Front agreement, 
which amended Colombia’s constitution to make only the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties legal.  The National Front was an attempt at enhancing government legitimacy, 
curbing the level of confrontation between the two parties and their supporters, and 
putting an end to La Violencia.146  Colombia passed a controversial agrarian reform law 
in 1961 and, coupled with a slowing economy, this contributed to growing civil unrest 
and the rise of several politically disenfranchised groups.  Thomas Marks summarized the 
origins of the FARC in response to La Violencia and the political situation in Colombia at 
that time.   
As a simple matter of protection, local populations banded together in self-
defense.  FARC, now the major Colombian insurgent movement, had its 
origins in one such area, a cluster of “independent republics”147 in the 
central Magdalena River valley.  The republics were led by communists 
and taken over again by the government in 1964-65 after order had been 
restored through a power-sharing arrangement, the National Front (Frente 
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Nacional, 1958-74), between the two major political parties, 
Conservatives and Liberals.  The rebel remnants moved into the 
southeastern savannah and jungle, where they engaged in “armed 
colonization.”148 
In 1966, the FARC began operating as a named group and was officially designated a 
branch of the Partido Comunista de Colombia, (PCC or Communist Party of 
Colombia).149   
3. FARC’s Humble Beginnings, Strategic Goal, and Pseudo-peace 
In the early years of the FARC’s existence, they adhered to a Soviet-style 
Marxist-Leninist ideological framework with financial support provided by the PCC.  
The FARC sought to overthrow the Colombian government, drive U.S. “imperialist” 
interests out of Latin America, and establish a socialist regime.150  Although confined to 
rural Colombia, the FARC met early success operating against weak military targets.  
Despite some initial tactical victories, a military counterinsurgency campaign and 
Colombia’s opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1968 kept the 
FARC’s strength in check.151   
The Colombian government also passed a law in 1968 authorizing the army to 
organize and arm civilians in the fight against subversion.152  Later, as the threat from the 
FARC and other groups increased, private businesses and drug traffickers created private 
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sanctioned and private groups, would eventually yield another problem for the 
government in the form of offensive oriented paramilitary organizations conducting their 
own atrocities and abuses of human rights.153   
Even with setbacks in the early 1970s, the FARC grew to approximately 3,000 
guerrillas by 1982, slowly building their organizational and armed capacity.154  In 1982, 
the FARC held their seventh party conference and decided that their primary task was to 
create a revolutionary army capable of fighting head to head with the Colombian security 
forces.  It was also at this meeting that the FARC concluded that they would need to tax 
the growing drug trade and directly control production areas to resource their long-range 
goal.155     
During this stage of FARC growth, they concentrated their activities on relatively 
small actions: recruitment, small raids, occupying villages and townships, and occasional 
kidnappings for ransom.156  By the early 1980s, many officials considered the FARC the 
strongest guerrilla group in Colombia and the FARC even attempted joint operations with 
the ELN.157  The parallel growth of several other guerrilla organizations and the sharp 
increase in illicit drug production and associated criminal activity during the late 1970s 
and into the 1980s caused growing concern in Colombia’s capital city, Bogota.158  The 
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FARC’s strength and influence in Colombia’s countryside, together with other domestic 
threats during this period, was enough to make the Colombian government consider 
negotiations. 
The FARC turned down newly elected President Betancur’s offer of amnesty in 
1982;159 however, in 1984 the FARC, the April 19th Movement (M-19), and the EPL 
agreed to a ceasefire with the government.  The National Dialogue outlined the terms for 
reintegrating the guerrillas and the government permitted the formation of the Patriotic 
Union (UP), a legal political party affiliated with the FARC and supported by the PCC.  
The UP would go on to gain significant parliamentary representation in the 1986 
elections.160  Much of the FARC reportedly abided by the ceasefire, but various FARC 
fronts violated the terms of the truce by continuing kidnappings and blackmail 
activities.161 
While President Betancur attempted to induce the FARC into formal participation 
in the government, the M-19 group undermined the general desire for peace by violating 
the 1984 cease-fire, alleging that the Colombian government systematically violated 
provisions of the truce.  The M-19 group seized the Palace of Justice in 1985, killing over 
100 people, including several Supreme Court justices.162  President Betancur’s successor, 
President Barco attempted to renew negotiations in 1986 to end the violence caused by 
the guerrilla groups, trying to enhance the legitimacy of the state in rural Colombia.  With 
elements of the FARC continuing operations and other leftist guerrilla groups still 
targeting the government, the UP (the FARC’s legal political party) went on the 
defensive, asserting that 550 of its members and supporters had been murdered by right-
wing terrorist groups and death squads.  Marks explains that, “Having suffered through 
previous bloodshed in which leftists had played a prominent role, Colombian society 
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abounded in those more than willing to go after those who still dreamed of Marxist 
liberation.”163  Essentially, the government was willing to integrate former guerrilla 
groups into the political system, but right wing militants violently opposed the policy, 
leading to increased violence between the groups.    
After a few more years of determined efforts to achieve a solution to the violence, 
by 1989, prospects for peace and demobilization of the guerrilla groups were again 
hopeful.164  Representatives of all of the major guerrilla groups, except the ELN, formed 
the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB) to negotiate on behalf of the 
guerrillas with the government.  At the same time, the ELN had carried out over 100 
attacks on the nation’s largest oil pipeline in less than 18 months, causing over an 
estimated US$400 million in loss and damage.  Paramilitary groups and narcotics 
traffickers were responsible for the most extreme acts of terror in the late 1980s, 
massacring leftist sympathizers and assassinating government officials.165  The M-19 
group and most of the EPL finally gave in to the political process, accepting 
demobilization in 1989 and 1991, respectively.166  After peace negotiations between the 
government and the CGSB stalled and restarted several times, divisions within the CGSB 
began to emerge.  The Colombian government spent the first half of the 1990s in failed 
negotiations with the CGSB and guerrilla violence continued unabated.167  Eventually, 
the peace talks were called off altogether and the FARC escalated their attacks on the 
Colombian military.   
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4. Rise of the FARC and Another Failed Attempt at Peace 
By 1998, with financing provided through extensive narcotics taxation and kidnap 
ransoms, the FARC had proven it could directly engage company sized elements of the 
Colombian Army.  The FARC cleared entire areas of government presence, targeting 
mayors and policemen, focusing on areas that would serve to isolate Bogota.  In August 
of 1998, coinciding with the Colombian Presidential election campaign, the FARC 
launched a series of attacks nationwide; in one such attack an estimated 1,200 insurgents 
overran an army company and counternarcotics police base.168  A 2001 Congressional 
Research Service Report acknowledged that the FARC had convinced many that they 
were stronger than the Colombian military.169   
The FARC, who had modeled their approach to insurgency on the Vietnamese 
style of “people’s war,” relied heavily on the rural population for support, either 
voluntary or coerced.  Paramilitary organizations, on the other hand, targeted insurgent 
groups, their supporters, as well as sympathizers.170  Corresponding to the escalation of 
FARC violence was an increase in paramilitary terror with the average citizen 
withstanding the worst of the effects from the war.  The results of the increased violence 
was that the FARC had actually began losing their rural support base; polls indicated that 
the FARC had little popular support or sympathy during this time.171 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate the substantial escalation of guerrilla, paramilitary, and 
military activity throughout Colombia from 1995–2003. 
                                                 
168 Thomas A. Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency,” Strategic Studies Institute 
U.S. Army War College, Monograph (January 2002): 8–9. 
169 Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options,” CRS Report for Congress 
(Updated February 12, 2001): 10, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30330.pdf (accessed October 
20, 2009).   
170 Ibid., 12-13. 
171 Thomas A. Marks, “Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for ‘Democratic 
Security,’” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Monograph (July 2005): 2. 
 62
 
Table 2.   Displaced people in the Colombian conflict, 1995–2003. 172 
 
Table 3.   Massacres in the Colombian conflict, 1995–2003.173 
 
Table 4.   Battlefield deaths in the Colombian conflict, 1995–2003.174 
 
In 1998, amidst the rising tide of insurgent and paramilitary violence throughout 
the country, Colombia’s newly elected president, Andres Pastrana Arango, made another 
attempt toward negotiating a settlement with the FARC.  As a precondition to the talks, 
Pastrana granted the FARC a 51,000 square-kilometer demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 
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south-central Colombia.175  Over the next four years, the FARC used the DMZ as a “safe 
haven” to continue profiting from illicit drug crops, kidnappings, and extortion in 
addition to building up their stores of military hardware.176  Marks described the DMZ, 
also called the “Zona,” as, “an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which to launch repeated 
strikes against government targets.”177  The FARC’s blatant disregard for the 
negotiations peaked in 1999 when they launched a massive offensive from the DMZ, 
including attacks in Bogota,178 which previously only the ELN, M-19, and various drug 
cartels had targeted.  
By early 2000, the FARC had become such a threat to Colombian security that the 
armed forces initiated a dramatic transformation of the military, with a reorganization of 
force structure, revamped training, and an overall increase in professionalization.179  
During the same period of the military’s self-imposed transformation, the U.S. approved 
legislation supporting President Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia,” which was aimed at ending 
armed conflict, eliminating drug trafficking, and promoting development.180  Marks’ 
primary point concerning U.S. policy in Colombia contends, “U.S. diplomats and military 
officials tended to embrace the flawed logic that Colombia’s problem was one of 
narcotics, with the security battle a consequence.”181  Initially, and despite the significant 
financial support provided by the U.S. to Plan Colombia, Marks maintains that the money 
was used primarily to neutralize narcotics and did little to assist the Colombian military’s 
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efforts at reform.182  Gradually though, continued U.S. support to Plan Colombia assisted 
Colombia in bridging the gap between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency, finally 
acknowledging that the two problems were intertwined.183    
Even with U.S. support to Plan Colombia, under Pastrana’s administration, the 
FARC continued to gain strength while Colombia’s leverage for negotiations 
deteriorated.  By the end of Pastrana’s term in 2002, the FARC had hijacked a domestic 
flight, kidnapped a presidential candidate, and mortared a church, killing 117 people in 
addition to other violent acts, increasing their direct challenge to Colombian security.  
After the FARC hijacked the plane, Pastrana ended the peace talks and ordered the 
military to retake the DMZ, setting the tone for the hard-lined Ivaro Uribe who would 
succeed him in the presidency later that year.184   
5. FARC Pressure forces National Response from Colombian 
Government 
In 2002, the FARC mortared the presidential palace in Bogota as newly elected 
President Uribe was being sworn in to the presidency.185  Uribe, wasted no time in 
directly challenging the perpetrators of violence in Colombia, taking a slightly different 
approach to Colombia’s problems than that of Pastrana’s attempt at negotiating peace.  
Uribe ran for the Colombian presidency on a platform that called for a national approach 
to Colombian security, vowing to defeat leftist guerrilla insurgents, address the 
paramilitary problem, and combat narcotics trafficking.186  
As the FARC attempted to transition to mobile warfare, the recently reformed 
Colombian Army met the FARC head on and forced the FARC into a defensive 
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posture.187  President Uribe’s administration complimented the Colombian military’s 
recent changes with the release of the new Democratic Security and Defense Policy in 
early 2003.  Uribe’s new policy holistically changed Colombia’s approach to their 
internal security problems from one that previously leaned almost solely on the military 
to one that employed all of the elements of Colombia’s national power.188  Under 
President Uribe, Colombia began a restoration of state presence and institutional 
authority by first establishing control with the military and national police then 
transitioning security to a combination of military, police, and local forces, enabling 
effective state institutions to take hold.  The government directed the plan to begin in the 
most strategically important areas and gradually expanded state control through a policy 
of territorial consolidation.189   
The FARC continued reaching toward their revolutionary goals through guerrilla 
action and main force attacks when possible; however, their level of popular support had 
dwindled as a result of terrorizing those who opposed the FARC.190  According to a 2008 
US Department of State report, terrorist attacks declined by 76 percent, homicides by 40 
percent, and kidnappings by 83 percent since Uribe took office in 2002.  The government 
has also demobilized over 40,000 terrorists under Uribe’s presidency and restored 
mayoral presence within all of Colombia’s municipalities.191  Most indicators point to a 
more stable and secure Colombia, but the FARC and other violent organizations still pose 
a threat to state control.    
Marks argues, that while Colombia’s current approach to counterinsurgency is 
both correct and sustainable; the danger lies in the potential for distraction from this 
approach due to the democratic political situation in Colombia.192  The protracted 
                                                 
187 Thomas A. Marks, “Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for ‘Democratic 
Security,’” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Monograph (July 2005): 6. 
188 Marks, “Sustainability of Colombian Military,” 7.  
189 Ibid., 8. 
190 Ibid., 10.  
191 U.S. Department of State, “Charting Colombia’s Progress,” March 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93761.pdf  (accessed October 27, 2009). 
192 Thomas Marks, “Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for ‘Democratic 
Security,’” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Monograph (July 2005): 20. 
 66
strategy of the FARC has lasted for over four decades and can certainly outlast the 
administration of an overall effective president in Uribe.  This leads, in Marks’ view, to 
the difficulty for democracies to sustain counterinsurgency campaigns, especially when 
there is little agreement on strategic ends and means.193 
6. Summary of Colombia and FARC Conflict and Analysis of Conflict 
Duration 
Colombia attempted a number of strategies to counter the FARC and other violent 
non-state actors.  Initially, the FARC’s relatively low level of insurgency brought only a 
limited military response from the Colombian government.  Confined almost exclusively 
to regions of Colombia that had little impact on the capital city or other major urban 
centers, the FARC grew slowly and steadily by capitalizing on their influence over the 
drug trade.  The concurrent growth of other insurgent movements and the rapid escalation 
of the illicit narcotics industry in the early 1980s prompted the government to initiate 
negotiations, the least costly solution for the government.  Attempting to end the 
insurgency peacefully, Colombia and the FARC agreed to a cease-fire and opened the 
government to a new political party, the UP.  Although negotiations were effective at 
demobilizing many guerrillas and some insurgent groups, other factions continued their 
revolutionary fight.   
The FARC came out of the negotiations and grew to the point of engaging the 
Colombian military in major combat operations; this led to Colombia’s final attempt at 
negotiating a settlement, which the government undertook from a position of weakness, 
and led to the creation of the DMZ.  With the FARC blatantly ignoring attempts at peace 
and using the DMZ as a safe-haven, the Colombian government called off the cease-fire 
and revamped their approach to a full-fledged, entire government effort of countering the 
FARC insurgency, having at least some indications of moderate success.   
Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars 
become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war 
directly affects its will to end the war; and desensitization to violence among the 
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participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent 
social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the 
state.    
The example of FARC growth and escalation of violence in proximity to or 
within Bogota supports the first hypothesis.  While the Colombian government 
continuously sought solutions to the FARC insurgency since its inception, it was not until 
the 2000–2002 timeframe and the peak of FARC insurgent violence that the government 
coordinated a proper allocation of effort and resources toward addressing and 
undermining the insurgency.  The level of violence and insurgent activity became so 
great that it challenged the government’s survival and therefore solidified their will to 
effectively deal with the FARC.  Colombia undertook most of their early 
counterinsurgency approaches in response to several smaller threats and not a single 
direct threat.  Colombia did not employ the necessary amount of resources for success, 
because the insurgent threat did not warrant it.  Colombia sought peace without 
addressing the root motivations of the insurgents; it was either a military approach or a 
negotiation approach, not a full spectrum governmental approach.   
Numerous other variables can account for Colombia’s recent massing of resources 
against the FARC, (dynamic leadership, correct application of lessons learned, external 
actors’ support, economic conditions, etc.); however, the evidence suggests that it was 
not until the FARC began conducting operations at their will and against practically any 
target they chose, to include targets within Bogota, that the Colombian government began 
a counterinsurgency campaign using every element of national power available.  The 
FARC grew to a point of posing a serious challenge to the Colombian government before 
the government resourced a productive counterinsurgency effort.  Had the FARC 
confined their activities to the countryside as they did throughout much of their history, 
then the Colombian government would have likely continued their status quo response, 
without military reform or full participation from the government.   
The case of the FARC insurgency in Colombia only partially supports the 
hypothesis concerning desensitization to violence.  The case study shows general 
observations concerning the level of violence and can neither confirm nor deny a 
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quantitative level or range of violence that could be considered a violent social 
equilibrium, especially due to the numerous violent non-state actors operating in 
Colombia over the past 40 years.  It is possible that until the late 1990s and through 
2000–2002 that the level of violence in Colombia had achieved a level of status quo or an 
equilibrium point and that the FARC’s continued growth upset this point.  In line with the 
first hypothesis, only when the FARC directly threatened Bogota and the Colombian 
military was the equilibrium level of violence disrupted.  Had the FARC continued their 
growth but not threatened the state, then it is possible that they would have remained 
within the limits of a violent social equilibrium and could have eventually grown strong 
enough to overwhelm Colombia’s security forces.   
In general, the Colombian society appears to have accepted periods of political 
violence as something that happens and not as a single shift in values that could be 
termed a violent social equilibrium.  The FARC escalation throughout the 1990s, along 
with the activities of other violent non-state actors, appears to have exceeded the limit of 
acceptable violence to the people of Colombia.  It is difficult to conclude whether this 
limit increased over the course of decades of violence or if the cumulative effects of 
violence finally reached a break point within the population in general.  As with the War 
of 1000 Days and La Violencia, the level of violence in Colombia during the 1990s 
finally reached a point that was no longer tolerable.   
It took over 30 years for the FARC, other guerrilla groups, and paramilitaries to 
reach a point that was no longer acceptable to Colombian society.  This point is proven at 
least partially by President Uribe’s initial success against the FARC and his re-election, 
which demonstrates popular support for his progress against the insurgents.  It is possible 
that as violence in Colombia is brought to an acceptable level, then space/opportunity 
will open, allowing the FARC or another group to re-emerge and again threaten the 
government.    
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IV. CONCLUSION 
I hoped that we wouldn’t forget the political basis of such conflicts and 
mistakenly place our main reliance on military, police, and economic 
actions without recognizing that they are merely instruments of political 
will…the only salvation is to switch defense priorities back to what they 
should have been all along—the building and strengthening of a national 
political structure that was at one with the people—and insist that all 
other actions contribute to this goal. Even as a wartime priority, such 
sensitive work takes time.  
 – Ed Lansdale on countering future people’s wars.194 
A. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS 
Though this section discusses the results of this study in some detail, the analysis 
of the hypotheses serve more as a means to the end of a better understanding of 
protracted internal conflicts and as a basis to develop recommendations for achieving 
positive ends to internal wars. 
The three cases studied in this thesis clearly support the hypothesis that the central 
government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end 
the war.  For both the CPP/NPA in the Philippines and the FARC in Colombia, the 
protraction of the wars is closely tied to the location of insurgent activity.  The CPP/NPA 
and the FARC purposely employed a strategy based on the concept of Maoist people’s 
war, building support for their rebellion outside of the cities until they were strong 
enough to directly oppose the central government and their security forces.  To this end, 
the CPP/NPA and the FARC both maintained a strong rural presence and have only been 
critically challenged by the government when they became strong enough to target the 
central government at will.  This point is more evident in the case of the FARC, 
especially from 2000–2002, when they began conducting an increasing number of 
operations in Bogota, spurning a full-scale governmental counterinsurgency campaign.  
In both cases though, the will of the central government to defeat the insurgents,  
                                                 
194 Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1991): 374 
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illustrated by the redirection of internal resources to counter the insurgencies, increased 
as the insurgents came closer to directly challenging the governments’ central control of 
the state.   
The case of Sri Lanka and the LTTE also supports the first hypothesis in that 
during each period of conflict LTTE attacks became more prevalent and on a larger scale 
before the GoSL launched a full-scale military effort to defeat the LTTE or attempt 
negotiations.  The GoSL maintained military pressure on the LTTE throughout each 
period of war, but as LTTE violence increased, so, too, did the GoSL increase its efforts 
to defeat the LTTE.  The relatively small physical size of Sri Lanka also had an effect on 
its will to defeat the LTTE.  Because Sri Lanka is a small island nation, Colombo felt, in 
some way, almost all of the violence associated with the LTTE.  The central government 
of Sri Lanka in Colombo was never far from the violence in that conflict, making almost 
every action conducted by the LTTE a threat to GoSL control.   
Support for the hypothesis that desensitization to violence among the participants 
in an internal war (a change in values within society) leads to a violent social equilibrium 
(stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state is not as strong as 
the first hypothesis.  Normalization to the effects of protracted violence is an easy 
concept to grasp, yet difficult to substantiate.  The cases of the LTTE and the FARC 
show an escalation of violence that exceeded the threshold of a violent social equilibrium 
in Sri Lanka and Colombia respectively.  The will of the opposing sides to continue 
fighting in those conflicts certainly grew over the course of decades of fighting, shown by 
the continuation of the insurgencies after multiple failed peace negotiations.  Each side 
was (or still is) fighting for their survival as a group seeking to achieve their goals 
through violent means.  The protraction of the conflicts theoretically made it easier to 
continue fighting without substantive gains; otherwise, the insurgent groups would have 
given up or accepted a settlement instead of continuing their fight for decades.  Both the 
LTTE and the FARC could have likely maintained their organizations had they not upset 
the equilibrium by increasing attacks against the state, which forced a comprehensive 
government response.   
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The case of the CPP/NPA in the Philippines demonstrates a violent social 
equilibrium more than the other cases.  The GRP continues their fight against the 
CPP/NPA, but faced with other internal challenges have not yet pooled the national 
resources required to undertake a campaign that will defeat the CPP/NPA.  Ultimately, 
the political and military actions of the GRP and the CPP/NPA represent a possible 
equilibrium of violence in the Philippines with neither side yielding to the other.   
B. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL/ MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
1. GRP and CPP/NPA  
The CPP/NPA failed to capitalize on their most viable political opportunity after 
the 1986 election.  With the fall of Marcos, the CPP/NPA were at their greatest numerical 
strength and consequently were in an excellent bargaining position; this coupled with 
President Aquino’s popularity and desire to negotiate with the CPP/NPA could have 
brought about a substantive change to the dynamics of the conflict and positive gains for 
the communist party.  The strategy employed by the CPP/NPA was proven by Mao and 
was working for them under the Marcos dictatorship; however, when Marcos left the 
presidency, they should have reduced their expectations of complete victory and settled 
with taking advantage of the evolving political situation to achieve realistic change by 
compromising and negotiating with the GRP.   
The GRP should have done more to reduce the CPP/NPA’s expectations of 
achieving victory in the 1986–1987 period in order to influence them into realistic 
negotiations.  The GRP could have also launched a robust information campaign aimed at 
reducing the CPP/NPA’s popular support base given the rapidly changing political 
situation during that time, making a broad appeal to support the new government brought 
about by a popular non-violent revolution.  It would have taken a unified front from both 
the GRP and the AFP to make the CPP/NPA believe their chances of complete success 
were extremely low, but dissension within both the military and the government after the 
removal of Marcos prevented the GRP from bringing the CPP/NPA into a realistic 
negotiated settlement.  The GRP did make significant gains in reducing the CPP/NPA 
threat after 1986, but systemic corruption (real or perceived) in government has 
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continued to feed the CPP/NPA ideology and ultimately the GRP has been unsuccessful 
at increasing its legitimacy.  By curbing government corruption and increasing the 
perceived legitimacy of the government while at the same time maintaining military 
pressure and making positive developmental progress in the country as a whole, the GRP 
can slowly erode the base of the CPP/NPA.   
2. Sri Lankan and LTTE  
The GoSL, as the official state actor, could have taken more substantive actions 
earlier in the conflict to relieve some of the grievances of the ethnic Tamils and increase 
their (GoSL) legitimacy to rule in the eyes of more moderate Tamils.  By the time the 
GoSL was willing to make worthwhile concessions to the Tamils, the LTTE had 
increased their support base, both internal and external, giving them more bargaining 
power with respect to their autonomy in Sri Lanka, leading to the cycle of conflict and 
ceasefire described throughout the case study.   
As the conflict continued, the GoSL should have recognized the strength of the 
LTTE’s position, within the region and internationally, and resolved to a more protracted 
approach to ending the conflict.  The GoSL should have simultaneously increased their 
capacity to counter high profile LTTE operations, addressed the legitimate concerns of 
moderate Tamils, thereby undermining the LTTE’s position in Tamil affairs, and 
launched an information campaign aimed at reducing the expectations for both the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils with respect to each side’s expected outcome for the conflict.   
Ideally, regional powerbrokers (or even a more robust international intervention 
by nations similar to Norway), not just India, could have played a more active role in 
enforcing ceasefires and negotiations during the Sri Lankan Civil War, possibly 
incorporating some sort of strategic bargaining/ negotiation framework to achieve the 
best results for each side.   
The LTTE, as the source of power and influence for the ethnic Tamils, should 
have recognized and taken full advantage of their relative strengths compared to the 
GoSL during the first parts (1983–1990) of the war.  The LTTE initially had a great deal 
of international sympathy; however, as the conflict continued and they increased their 
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employment of terror against the GoSL, the LTTE lost legitimacy, credibility, and 
sympathy from their supporters.  The LTTE could have scaled back their level of 
violence in a more protracted approach to achieving their goal of autonomy and they 
would have likely maintained a fair amount of international support, forcing the GoSL to 
make a more earnest attempt toward honest negotiations.  By trying to take on the GoSL 
too quickly during each phase of the conflict, the LTTE unnecessarily exposed 
themselves to high casualties and an escalating war against the numerically superior 
SLAF, which ultimately led to their defeat on the battlefield. 
Both sides of the Sri Lankan Civil War had a lot to gain by concluding the fight 
sooner rather than later.  Well over 70,000 people lost their lives in the conflict, several 
hundred thousands more lost their homes and livelihoods, and both sides wasted 
incalculable amounts of resources, production, time, and money because a lasting 
settlement was never reached.  The essential element missing from resolving the Sri 
Lankan Civil War sooner was not the capacity of either side’s military or their will to 
win, it was the absence of a legitimate, multi-national, nonpartisan coalition to broker and 
enforce a long term resolution that both the GoSL and the LTTE (or a majority of ethnic 
Tamils who could have undercut the LTTE) would have viewed as a better option than 
war.   
3. Colombia and the FARC 
While the evidence suggests that Colombia has made substantial progress toward 
improving their internal security and overall domestic stability, the recent advances 
against the FARC and other domestic threats could have been achieved far sooner.   
The exclusionary two party political system established in the agreement to 
legitimize the Colombian government and bring an end to La Violencia, actually 
disenfranchised rural portions of Colombia’s population, leading to the growth of several 
armed revolutionary groups.  Colombia should have recognized that their political system 
left no alternative for certain groups to be heard other than by mobilizing a violent 
opposition to the government.  Rather than attempting to end the insurgencies primarily 
through military means, a government structure that was more inclusive and therefore 
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perceived as more legitimate would have likely underscored the logic of armed 
opposition to the central government.  With a representative and legitimate central 
government, Colombia could have sought to methodically improve the image of the state 
in the areas where Colombia had historically little or no government influence.  A 
protracted approach taken by the government to enhance its legitimacy and build genuine 
influence among the rural population would have likely reduced the motivations of 
insurgency to negligible levels.  
When the Colombian government did open the political system to a third party, 
the UP, and negotiated with some insurgent groups, breakaway guerrilla factions and 
violent political rivalries erupted and destabilized the potential for lasting peace.  Without 
the ability to monopolize security and maintain control within its own political system, 
the Colombian government could do little more than continue pursuing integration of 
violent non-state actors from a weak position.  Colombia required effective security 
forces to retake the balance of power from the multiple insurgencies, paramilitaries, and 
drug cartels before a sustainable attempt toward a negotiated settlement could take hold.  
The military reform that began during President Pastrana’s term finally enabled 
Colombia to begin a long term and effective approach to defeating the insurgents under 
the whole of government counterinsurgency strategy put into effect under President 
Uribe.   
C. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
REGARDING PROTRACTED INTERNAL WARS  
1. Distractions Affecting the Counterinsurgent’s Will 
The governments of each case studied in this thesis had at least two major 
insurgencies threatening the governments’ control.  Unable to mass efforts against any 
one group individually, each government initially attempted to attend to their internal 
problems directly through military means, depleting valuable government resources.   
The Philippines had to contend with the CPP/NPA, the MNLF, the MILF, and 
multiple breakaway groups; Sri Lanka faced threats not only from the LTTE, but also 
from the JVP and interference from India with the IPKF; and Colombia had to deal with 
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the FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19, various paramilitaries including the AUC, and large drug 
cartels.  The governments of these countries all had to make tough decisions regarding 
how best to address their respective problems.  Ultimately, it is the government’s 
responsibility to meet fundamental requirements for their citizens and a government that 
cannot effectively provide for the basic needs of their population risks losing control to a 
group that will.   
Though this thesis does not directly address this point, each case demonstrated 
that the central governments could not militarily defeat multiple insurgencies 
simultaneously.  The Philippines is still fighting against the CPP/NPA, the MILF, and 
various factions of each.  Sri Lanka had to negotiate peace with the LTTE while they 
suppressed the JVP.  Only after addressing the JVP insurgency was Sri Lanka able to 
defeat the LTTE by direct military action and this was after a major split within the 
LTTE.  Colombia is still battling the FARC, the ELN, and various paramilitary groups, 
yet is making slow progress against these threats.   
The distraction of a government’s focus from effectively dealing with an armed 
challenger is implicit in the finding that a government’s will to defeat an insurgency 
increases with the proximity of violence to the central government.  The government has 
to prioritize its allocation of resources, which became clear in each case study.  As an 
insurgent group increased their challenge to the state, either by sheer growth or by 
increased violence near the seat of government, the state redirected its focus to meet the 
challenge.  Because governments possess finite resources and there will always be 
competing demands for those resources, it should become clear to a government that they 
should not waste assets trying to quickly defeat an emerging threat, especially one that is 
recognized as protracted.  Rather, governments should counter emerging threats with 
their own protracted strategy, strategically balancing their resources to reduce support to 
insurgent groups while improving security.  If a country’s population perceives the 
central government to be legitimate and the government provides for the basic needs of 
its citizenry (including security), then support for an insurgency will erode; therefore, 
governments should focus the preponderance of their resources not on directly engaging 
insurgents, but on enhancing their own legitimacy and meeting the expectations of the 
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populace.195  Managing public perceptions, enhancing the government’s legitimacy and 
countering the insurgent’s legitimacy, is crucial to an effective government response to 
insurgency.   
The government that faces serious threats to its internal security needs to prepare 
itself and its citizens psychologically for a long fight and recognize that a quick 
resolution to an internal war is unrealistic.  Strategic patience is paramount to a 
sustainable peace.  The counterinsurgency practitioner must approach the conflict with 
the mindset that he can outlast the insurgent and then work toward that end by denying 
the appeal of a quick solution and the inherent waste of vital resources that comes with 
the quest for an expedient end.   
2. Failed Negotiations 
Each of the cases studied in this thesis experienced at least some failure to achieve 
an effective settlement through negotiating.  While academics have written entire books 
on how to be effective at strategic negotiating, a few simple lessons come out of this 
thesis with respect to negotiating solutions to internal conflicts.   
• Insurgents will take advantage of negotiations to rest, refit, and reorganize; the 
counterinsurgent should seek ways to verify the veracity of the insurgent’s 
intentions for negotiating. 
• Effective settlements cannot be achieved from a position of weakness, unless 
a significant third party or coalition can influence, monitor, and control the 




                                                 
195 Two excellent references for the study of the role and mechanisms of legitimacy are: Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995) and The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy, Bruce 
Gilley (New York: Colombia University Press, 2009) 
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• Lack of trust seems to be the deciding factor in negotiating a settlement to an 
internal war.  The legitimacy of both sides’ actions in a negotiation 
corresponds directly with trust.  Each side should pursue every effort to 
enhance their own trustworthiness; third party intervention may help broker a 
lasting settlement  
• Information operations or psychological operations might help to strengthen 
the perceived negotiating position of one side or the other and can do the same 
to reduce the expectations of the opponent; this could help set the conditions 
to maximize the settlement.   
Failed negotiations are a common characteristic from the internal war cases 
studied in this thesis.  The most peaceful solution to conflict, a negotiated settlement, also 
appears to be the least likely outcome in prolonged internal wars.  Future studies of 
internal conflicts could provide explicit analysis into the causes of failures in conflict 
negotiation and find ways to increase the probability of successfully negotiating 
settlements between belligerents.   
3. Strategic Failures 
The strategic interaction of opponents in the cases studied in this thesis could add 
to the explanation of prolonged conflict.  Both the CPP/NPA and the FARC employed a 
deliberate protracted strategy to achieve their revolutionary goals; the governments of the 
Philippines and Colombia countered these revolutions predominately through direct 
military means.  As long as the state actor attempted a direct military solution to the 
protracted insurgent strategy, the insurgent’s strength grew steadily.  It could be that the 
state actors involved in these protracted insurgencies became so attached to their 
respective strategies that they could not recognize their own strategic failures.  This 
shortcoming of not wanting to change from a certain way of doing things is a 
psychological phenomena referred to by Ephraim Kam as “judgmental biases.”196  
Alternatively, if the state’s response to the insurgent becomes institutionalized, then it 
                                                 
196 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victims Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 
1988): 85–156.  
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also becomes unresponsive to necessary change.  Over the course of the war, the 
strategies did not change until some major event altered the way the actors perceived the 
conflict; the EDSA People’s Power Revolution in the Philippines and President 
Pastrana’s failed negotiations with the FARC in Colombia.  The most effective way to 
overcome a judgmental bias is to recognize that a bias may exist and to seek another 
perspective, preferably from an outside actor.   
In Sri Lanka, the strategies only changed from those of direct military 
engagement to attempted negotiations with the negotiations appearing as a way for both 
sides to refit in preparation for another round of conflict.  Sri Lanka and the LTTE seem 
to have accepted their war as a war to the very end, with their respective will to win 
emboldened throughout each escalation of hostilities.   
4. Assistance to Countries Trapped in Cycles of Conflict 
This thesis did not look specifically into the function that external actors played in 
each of the conflicts studied.  To some degree, third-party intervention on behalf of the 
state or the insurgent can affect the duration of the war.  The case of Sri Lanka and the 
LTTE demonstrates some of the possible roles of external influence on an internal war, as 
shown with the Tamil Diaspora’s financial support to the LTTE, India’s intervention first 
with covert support of the LTTE and later as peacekeepers, and finally, Norway’s attempt 
to induce peace between the two groups.  Future research into the field of conflict 
resolution could isolate the variable of external actors’ support to internal wars, 
determine the conditions in which external support positively or negatively influenced the 
outcome of the conflict, and present recommendations for providing effective support.  
This thesis did bring forward some implicit findings for providing external support to the 
state actor of an internal war.   
Prior to providing assistance to countries experiencing prolonged periods of 
violence, the benefactor of aid should gain a clear understanding of the intricacies of the 
conflict.  The external supporter needs to conduct his own assessment of the war and 
determine how his intervention will affect not only the war’s belligerents but also the 
effects on regional actors as well.   
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The outside backer should take care to enhance the legitimacy of the beneficiary 
and ensure that all instruments of assistance are coordinated in a unified and mutually 
supporting manner.  All support, be it financial, military, developmental, etc., should 
contribute to a clearly defined strategy that enhances the beneficiary’s ability to achieve a 
long-term unilateral effort.  The sponsor should avoid activities that could detract from 
the recipient’s legitimacy; understanding the second- and third-order effects and the 
context in which the participants and regional actors will judge the support.  
D. THE WAY AHEAD 
The study of conflict resolution and internal wars has the potential to influence 
positive change in many of the world’s war zones.  This thesis has demonstrated that to 
some degree, a government’s determination to defeat an insurgency is closely tied to the 
physical location that an insurgent threatens the government; insurgents can maintain 
their organization as long as it does not exceed the government’s tolerance for violence, 
especially as it occurs in the capital city.  To a lesser extent, this thesis shows that as a 
conflict continues over the course of decades, both sides’ resolve to continue fighting is 
emboldened and therefore, the likelihood of continued fighting increases; they view war 
as the only way to attain a resolution.  In a war of survival, for both sides it becomes a 
battle of wills.   
The case studies in this thesis demonstrate that the most effective strategy in 
resolving an internal war is one that involves a whole of government approach and as 
Colombia has shown recently, implemented with the understanding that the state cannot 
achieve a quick military victory.  Each case showed the futility of attempting an 
exclusively military end to insurgency.  Sri Lanka, the exception to the whole of 
government approach, viewed the military solution as the only way to achieve success.  
The Sri Lankan strategy led to four distinct outbreaks of hostilities and caused an 
unseemly humanitarian crisis as the SLAF employed every means available to destroy the 
LTTE.  The Philippines has yet to coordinate an effective allocation of government 
resources toward ending their war with the CPP/NPA and without a consistently 
legitimate government is not likely to successfully resolve this conflict in the near future.   
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A combination of strategic patience, enhanced public confidence in government, 
and a protracted whole of government approach to countering insurgency are 
fundamental to successfully bringing internal conflicts under control.  These three 
conditions are necessary to end cycles of prolonged war in which some countries find 
themselves and cannot seem to arrest the solution.   
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